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THE FLAWED CORPORATE FINANCE OF DELL AND
DFC GLOBAL
Charles Korsmo
Minor Myers*
ABSTRACT
In a pair of momentous decisions, the Delaware Supreme Court recently
attempted to bring clarity and reason to a corporate law topic of increasing
importance: appraisal rights. In both decisions—Dell and DFC Global—the
Court insisted that it did nothing more than apply “established principles of
corporate finance.” Yet in analyzing the financial ideas and concepts at play,
the Court made four critical mistakes. First, the Supreme Court ignored the
differences between how public markets price risk and how private parties—
particularly financial sponsors—price risk. Second, the Court took the wellsupported evidence of information efficiency in securities markets as necessarily
implying a high degree of value efficiency. It then compounded this error by
attributing this value efficiency not simply to the securities market but also to
the deal market. Third, the Court succumbed to a flawed analogy between the
fiduciary duty and appraisal contexts, implying that conditions of pricing
efficiency are met whenever directors satisfy their minimum fiduciary
obligations. Fourth, the Court treated company valuation as a mechanical,
arithmetical calculation, downplaying the essential role of human judgment.
This Article analyzes these errors and considers some potential implications for
the future of appraisal rights in particular and for M&A markets and diversified
public stockholders more generally.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past decade, the law of stockholder appraisal rights has become an
active and hotly debated topic in corporate law scholarship and practice. The
dollar value at stake in appraisal claims has grown dramatically, as has the
sophistication of the dissenting stockholders. In many cases, the dissenting
stockholders are specialists who acquire positions in the target company after
the announcement of the transaction with the intent to demand a judicial
appraisal of the company—a practice that has been (inaptly) dubbed “appraisal
arbitrage.”1
In 2017, the Delaware Supreme Court (Supreme Court) issued a pair of
important opinions on the stockholder appraisal remedy—its first serious
pronouncements since the rise of appraisal arbitrage. These two opinions—Dell2
and DFC Global3—both involved situations where specialist investors dissented
from a public company merger and where the Delaware Court of Chancery
(Court of Chancery) determined that the fair value of each company was higher
than the merger price negotiated by the target board. Both decisions were
reversed by the Supreme Court for failure to justify the decision to depart from
the negotiated deal price as the best evidence of fair value.4
The Supreme Court clearly intended for these two opinions to stand as
testaments to the importance of market pricing in mergers and acquisitions
(M&A). The theme of both opinions is that the Court of Chancery should have
relied more heavily on the price negotiated by the target company’s board of
directors.5 In both cases, reasonable minds may disagree about whether the fair
value of each company should have been the deal price or something more like
the fair value found initially by the Court of Chancery. But, as detailed below,
whatever one’s views on the individual case outcomes, the opinions are
problematic in their misunderstandings of basic principles of modern finance.
Most fundamentally, the Supreme Court embraces a crude notion of market
efficiency, which it wields to dismiss any doubts as to the information content
of the deal price.
1
See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public Company M&A,
92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1574 n.86 (2015) [hereinafter Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage] (“In fact,
appraisal arbitrage is not true ‘arbitrage,’ in the sense that it does not involve exploiting a price difference that
is eventually expected to disappear. The term ‘arbitrage’ is used somewhat loosely . . . in order to draw an
analogy to merger arbitrage.”).
2
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 5, 16–18 (Del. 2017).
3
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 360–61 (Del. 2017).
4
Dell, 177 A.3d at 19; DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 349.
5
See infra Section I.D.2.
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The Supreme Court’s message to the trial courts is simple: absent a culpable
breach of duty, trust the market and have faith in the negotiated price.6 The
court’s faith may be not so much in the efficiency of markets as in the perfection
of its merger jurisprudence. These opinions leave the impression that a deal
process that meets the bare procedural design tests imposed in recent fiduciary
duty cases such as MFW,7 C&J,8 and Corwin9—namely, a deal conditioned on
approval by independent directors and a majority of disinterested stockholders—
is good enough and will never merit financial recovery for stockholders. Under
this view, the statutory appraisal remedy is simply unnecessary as a tool of
corporate governance, at least in the public company context. Just as Corwin
may have driven a nail into the merger class action, Dell risks smothering the
fledgling utility of the appraisal remedy in its crib.
At root, the court appears convinced that we have reached the end of history
on merger process design and that recent fiduciary duty case law has “solved”
the problem of agency costs in merger transactions. As a prominent financial
columnist for Bloomberg has noted, the Delaware courts have reached “a rather
hopeful conclusion: After decades of merger litigation, the merger process has
been refined and perfected, and now it can for the most part run on its own.”10
We are less sanguine. When the guardians go to sleep, history has a way of
roaring back. Without meaningful protection from the courts, exploitation of
minority stockholders will increase, and capital formation will be impaired.11
Following Corwin, appraisal is the last judicial sentry still on watch.12

6
At least one Vice Chancellor has interpreted the Supreme Court’s message even more strongly, finding
that, in the absence of a culpable breach of duty, Dell and DFC Global compelled him to award the unaffected
market price, which was well below the deal price. See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks,
Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 922139, at *24, *30, *34 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).
7
Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 638, 644 (Del. 2014) (involving a controlling
stockholder squeeze out).
8
C&J Energy Servs., Inc. v. City of Miami Gen. Emps.’ Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1052, 1067–68 (Del.
2014) (holding that a single-bidder sales process with the conventional battery of deal protections can satisfy
Revlon).
9
Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 306, 308–09 (Del. 2015) (involving a third-party
transaction).
10
Matt Levine, Opinion, Appraisal Arbitrage Is in Trouble, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 22, 2018, 10:01 AM),
https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2018-02-22/appraisal-arbitrage-is-in-trouble.
11
See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, Appraisal After Dell, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING
TIMES: IS THE LAW KEEPING UP? (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall Stuart Thomas eds., forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 33) (“The ‘law and finance’ literature demonstrates that protecting minority shareholders
improves capital formation. The intuition for this empirical finding is that prospective investors in the next dorm
room startup will be wary to commit capital if they do not have adequate protections at exit.”).
12
See id. (“With the near-death of post-closing fiduciary duty litigation in the post-Corwin world,
appraisal remains the last check against a deficient and/or conflicted deal process.”).
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It would be a shame to send this lonely sentry back to its bunk. Whatever
one thinks of Corwin,13 the fiduciary duty class action it eviscerated was largely
a judicial creation, clearly subject to revision by the judiciary. Moreover, by the
time of Corwin, a mountain of empirical evidence had accumulated showing that
the merger class action was being abused and was not serving any governance
function.14 The appraisal remedy is an altogether different story. Appraisal is a
statutory remedy, amended periodically by Delaware’s General Assembly.15
Moreover, the empirical evidence on modern appraisal is positive, finding little
evidence of abusive litigation and substantial evidence that it is playing a
positive but nascent governance role.16 The arguments against appraisal have
largely been anecdotal or emotional in nature and have thus far been carried
forward primarily by law students17 and prominent deal advisers.18 Two recently
released academic papers mount a defense of the Dell and DFC Global
decisions,19 though both papers succumb to the very same mistakes that the
Supreme Court committed in the cases themselves.20

13
One of us argues elsewhere that Corwin goes too far in limiting merger class actions, and will have
unfortunate governance consequences. See Charles R. Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat from Judicial Scrutiny of
Mergers, 9 U.C. IRVINE L.R. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 55) [hereinafter Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat].
14
See, e.g., Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 465, 484–85 (2015); Jill E. Fisch et al., Confronting the
Peppercorn Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV.
557, 559–60, 572 (2015). We piled our own stone upon this mountain. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers,
The Structure of Stockholder Litigation: When Do the Merits Matter?, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 829, 889 (2014).
15
Indeed, the Delaware legislature recently convened a blue-ribbon panel of the Council on Corporation
Law to consider amendments to the appraisal statute. The panel recommended—and the legislature ultimately
adopted—modest reforms, while rejecting any wholesale remaking of the appraisal remedy. See H.R. 371, 148th
Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Del. 2016); Charles Korsmo & Minor Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal
Litigation, 41 DEL. J. CORP. L. 279, 308–12 (2017).
16
See infra notes 53–82 and accompanying text.
17
See, e.g., Desiree M. Baca, Note, Curbing Arbitrage: The Case for Reappraisal of Delaware’s
Appraisal Rights, 13 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 425, 427, 460 (2017); Craig Boyd, Comment, Appraisal Arbitrage:
Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist Shareholders, 65 U. KAN. L. REV. 497, 497 (2016) (“The
words that come to mind when attempting to define ‘arbitrage’ inevitably include terms such as lies, trickery,
unfair play, and deception. Intuition calls us to correct the system . . . .”); Stanley Onyeador, Note, The Chancery
Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs Expose Need to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70
VAND. L. REV. 339, 356, 374 (2017).
18
See Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 5) (cataloguing deal adviser response to the Court of
Chancery opinion in Dell).
19
See William J. Carney, The Death of Appraisal Arbitrage: Ending Windfalls for Deal Dissenters, 43
DEL. J. CORP. L. (forthcoming 2018); Jonathan Macey & Joshua Mitts, Asking the Right Question: The Statutory
Right of Appraisal and Efficient Markets (Nov. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3279838.
20
For example, both papers assume that the market for individual shares is informative of the value of
the entire firm. See Carney, supra note 19 (manuscript at 91) (“[T]he pre-announcement market price should be
presumed to be the best evidence of fair value.”); Macey & Mitts, supra note 19 (manuscript at 36) (“The share
price of the target that is generated by the market, unvarnished by the price effects associated with the deal itself
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In this Article, we focus on four errors the Supreme Court committed in
applying modern finance theory.21 First, in considering how risk bears on the
pricing of transactions, the court ignored the difference between how diversified
investors price risk and how undiversified investors, like private equity
investors, price risk.22 A basic tenet of modern portfolio theory is that, for
diversified investors, only market or systematic risks affect asset values, while
firm-specific risks are largely irrelevant to pricing. Undiversified investors, on
the other hand, must discount for both types of risk. In both opinions, the court
devotes pages to the effect of risk on asset prices without recognizing this critical
distinction between types of risk.23 This leads to basic errors in how the court
analyzed the legal issues before it. Diversified (public) shareholders need only
discount for market risk, while concentrated (private) shareholders must
discount for both market and firm-specific risk. For DFC Global, in particular,
firm-specific risk was especially high,24 potentially creating a significant gap
between the price paid by a private equity buyer and the company’s value as a
going concern.
The second mistake is to confuse the well-supported evidence of
informationally efficient securities markets with crude notions of value
efficiency.25 If the past thirty years of financial economics have taught anything,
it is that markets can be extremely efficient at arbitraging away new information
without any assurance that prices will be “accurate” in any fundamental way.
The court compounds this error by ascribing to the market for entire
companies—the deal market—the efficiency of the market for individual shares
are the best indicator of value for the target . . . .”). The gravity of that mistake is explored below in section II.B.
Relatedly, both papers also rely on a conception of statutory “fair value” that would strip public stockholders of
their interest in the firm as a going concern, a reading neither dictated by the statute nor desirable as a matter of
policy. See Part III.C.
21
See generally Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017).
Although we seek to cover the Supreme Court’s most serious errors, our canvas is not exhaustive. For example,
the Supreme Court also misunderstood the basic auction theory concept of the “Winner’s Curse,” erroneously
believing that it would only come into play if an existing bid is already at fair value. See Dell, 177 A.3d at 33
(“If a deal price is at a level where the next upward move by a topping bidder has a material risk of being a selfdestructive curse, that suggests the price is already at a level that is fair.”). In reality, potential bidders proceed
by backward induction and, seeing no ultimate path to success, will refrain from bidding at all against an
informed party with matching rights, as in Dell. See Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 18–20)
(concluding that the Dell Supreme Court’s “characterization of the winner’s curse is not correct.”). For criticisms
of the Dell court’s mischaracterizations of the trial record and unusual application of the abuse of discretion
standard, see id. (manuscript at 13–26).
22
See infra notes 244–92 and accompanying text.
23
See, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d at 28, 30, 32–33, 37–38; DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,
172 A.3d 346, 349–50, 353, 358, 369, 373, 380, 385 (Del. 2017).
24
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 353.
25
See infra notes 293–351 and accompanying text.
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of stock. This is incorrect. The market for corporate control, dealing with a
limited universe of buyers for companies that generally lack exact substitutes, is
unavoidably less efficient than the market for individual shares.26 The pricing
efficiency of this very different market depends on a variety of factors that the
court failed to consider.
The court’s third error is to assume that conditions of pricing efficiency were
met in the sale of a company whenever the directors satisfied their minimum
fiduciary obligations.27 This assumption has no basis in economics, corporate
finance, or auction theory, and no evidence exists in support of it. It also ignores
the context in which fiduciary duty liability operates. Corporate fiduciary
liability—focused as it is on the personal liability of directors, and properly
concerned with the possibility of risk-aversion—is deliberately and
appropriately forgiving of director misbehavior. As a result, instances abound
where a board might satisfy fiduciary standards but nonetheless fail to conduct
a sales process that generates reliable evidence of the company’s fair value. As
Albert Choi and Eric Talley have recently demonstrated, a sales process that
satisfies Delaware’s deferential fiduciary duty standards can result in a
negotiated price that departs dramatically from the fair value that would emerge
from a better-crafted sales process.28 The court, however, has fallen into the trap
of mistaking a process that is not bad enough to justify personal fiduciary
liability for a process that is good enough to have confidence in the resulting
price.
The fourth major mistake is that the court approached valuation as a
mechanical arithmetic exercise, attempting to evade the unavoidable need for
human judgment.29 In DFC Global in particular, the Court of Chancery adopted
a set of post-trial adjustments to its discounted cash flow (DCF) analysis that, in
combination, resulted in a valuation that squared with the available evidence.30
On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed one aspect of those adjustments, while
leaving the others in place.31 Viewed in isolation, the Supreme Court’s analysis
of the factor in question was reasonable, with one small problem: it generated
an implausible result. In part, this reflects the current Supreme Court’s
preference for bright-line rules over Delaware’s traditional respect for and

26

See Dell, 177 A.3d at 35.
See infra Section II.C.
28
See Albert H. Choi & Eric Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule, 35 J.L ECON. &
ORG. (forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 26–27).
29
See infra notes 382–400 and accompanying text.
30
See DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 350 (Del. 2017).
31
Id.
27
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reliance on the judgment of its chancellors. In company valuation, however,
human common sense is too costly a sacrifice to lay upon the altar of
convenience.
These foundational mistakes color all of the legal conclusions that the
Supreme Court draws in reliance upon them. Given their full-throated
expression by the court, these misunderstandings must be rectified before they
do lasting harm to Delaware law, public stockholders, and the competitiveness
of U.S capital markets. In recent decisions, the Court of Chancery has labored
mightily to preserve its reputation for financial sophistication and good
judgment through flexible application of Dell and DFC Global.32 But the
strictures of the Supreme Court’s opinions may not always be easy to avoid. In
the Aruba Networks appraisal, for example, Vice Chancellor Laster found
himself compelled by the “market efficiency” logic of DFC and Dell to an
absurd result: equating “fair value” to the pre-announcement trading price.33
Further absurdities may follow if the Delaware Supreme Court’s errors go
uncorrected.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I examines recent developments in
appraisal litigation, including the growing body of empirical research on the
topic, and summarizes the Dell and DFC Global cases. Part II explores each of
the four mistakes the Delaware Supreme Court made in its opinions. Part III
works through some implications that follow in the wake of these two opinions.
I.

THE RISE OF MODERN APPRAISAL

This Part charts developments in appraisal law and practice in recent years.
Over the past decade, appraisal activity in Delaware has increased
substantially.34 As the value of claims and the number of filings has grown, so
has the sophistication and specialization of those pursuing appraisal.35 The rise
of appraisal has attracted interest from researchers, who have explored the
32
See Blueblade Capital Opportunities LLC v. Norcraft Cos., Inc., No. 11184-VCS, 2018 WL 3602940,
at *2 (Del. Ch. July 27, 2018) (finding “significant flaws in the process leading to the Merger that undermine
the reliability of the Merger Price as an indicator of Norcraft’s fair value”).
33
See Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 922139,
at *28, *30, *44–45 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018). In short, despite an opinion suggesting that the directors did a poor
job selling the company and extracting value from the buyer, Vice Chancellor Laster felt constrained by DFC
and Dell to find that the deal price minus synergies represented the best measure of fair value. Id. at 44–45. In
the absence of any reliable method for estimating the amount of synergies reflected in the deal price, the Vice
Chancellor felt further constrained to defer to the pre-announcement trading price as the least arbitrary estimate
of Aruba’s value as a stand-alone company. Id.
34
See infra note 36.
35
See infra note 51.
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crucial policy questions of how stockholders have used appraisal and what effect
the remedy has on the broader M&A market. Thus far, the empirical work on
appraisal has painted a rather promising picture. This empirical support,
however, for appraisal has remained largely unacknowledged by the Delaware
courts in the face of continued expressions of unease by deal advisers and other
practitioners. The Delaware Supreme Court’s Dell and DFC Global opinions
suggest that practitioner angst over appraisal has registered far more loudly with
the court than scholarly approval.
A. The Growth of Appraisal Activity
As we have shown elsewhere, the use of appraisal rights has flourished in
this decade.36 The causes of that growth remain unclear, as does the question of
whether that growth will persist in light of the Delaware jurisprudence discussed
below.
The appraisal remedy is nearly as old as the corporate form itself,37 and it
entitles a dissenting stockholder to refuse the merger consideration and instead
have a court determine the “fair value” of the dissenter’s stock.38 In Delaware,
the remedy is available when a merger requires that public stockholders accept
at least some cash in exchange for their cancelled shares.39 Even in those
circumstances, stockholders are not automatically eligible to exercise their
appraisal rights. To preserve them, they must not vote in favor of the transaction
and must deliver written notice of their intent to the company by a specified
time.40

36
See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1569; Charles R. Korsmo & Minor
Myers, Interest in Appraisal, 42 J. CORP. L. 109, 111 (2016); Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal
Litigation, supra note 15, at 282, 287, 289.
37
Appraisal rights became widely available in the early twentieth century. See MELVIN A. EISENBERG,
THE STRUCTURE OF THE CORPORATION: A LEGAL ANALYSIS 75 (1976); see also Robert B. Thompson, Exit,
Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal’s Role in Corporate Law, 84 GEO. L.J. 1, 14–15 (1995); Barry M.
Wertheimer, The Shareholders’ Appraisal Remedy and How Courts Determine Fair Value, 47 DUKE L.J. 613,
618–19 (1998).
38
See generally DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, § 262 (2018) (citing most recent electronic version); see also
MODEL BUS. CORP. ACT § 13.02 (2016).
39
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 262(b) (2018) (citing most recent electronic version).
40
See Ala. By-Products Corp. v. Cede & Co. ex rel. Shearson Lehman Bros., Inc., 657 A.2d 254, 260
n.10 (Del. 1995) (“In an appraisal proceeding, however, shareholders enter the appraisal class by complying
with the statutory formalities required to perfect their appraisal rights. Thus, shareholders seeking appraisal ‘opt
in’ to a class, invariably before suit is even filed, rather than ‘opt out.’”).
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This unique procedural structure has been the target of reform proposals over
the years,41 but as we noted in earlier work, “the very feature of appraisal action
that attracts the most criticism—the unavailability of class treatment—also has
the great virtue of largely eliminating the kinds of agency problems that can lead
to abusive and wasteful shareholder litigation.”42 With their own interests in
mind, stockholders will only seek appraisal where their position is large enough
to justify the costs of the proceeding. As a result, the pathologies of class action
litigation, where plaintiffs’ attorneys control claims and often resolve them in
ways that generate no benefits for stockholders,43 are highly unlikely in
appraisal.
Although the remedy was little used for decades,44 our prior work documents
a dramatic increase in appraisal activity that began in 2011.45 Before that time,
only about 5% of public company transactions attracted appraisal petitions, and
those stockholders who dissented generally did so as a one-off exercise.46 Across
various measures—claims filed, deals challenged, the dollar value of claims—
appraisal activity began to increase after 2011.47 During 2015, more than $2
billion of stock dissented in Delaware,48 and in 2016 20% of public company
transactions faced an appraisal claim.49
The group of dissenting stockholders also grew more specialized and
sophisticated. The standing requirements for appraisal have long been unique
among corporate claims: stockholders who acquire stock after the announcement
of a transaction may still exercise their appraisal rights.50 This allows investment
41
Jesse M. Fried & Mira Ganor, Agency Costs of Venture Capitalist Control in Startups, 81 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 967, 1004–05 (2006) (noting that “many shareholders find it difficult to meet the complicated procedural
requirements and deadlines of the appraisal remedy” and that “[t]he shortcomings of the appraisal remedy are
widely known” and that “[c]ommentators have long recognized that appraisal is a remedy that few shareholders
will seek under any circumstance”); Bayless Manning, The Shareholder’s Appraisal Remedy: An Essay for
Frank Coker, 72 YALE L.J. 223, 260 (1962) (“The appraisal remedy is of virtually no economic advantage to
the usual shareholder except in highly specialized situations.”).
42
Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1565.
43
Fisch et al., supra note 14, at 559.
44
2 PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 293–94 (AM. LAW
INST. 1994) (noting the remedy “is seldom utilized”).
45
Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1569.
46
Id.
47
Id. at 1569–72.
48
Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Recent Developments in Stockholder Appraisal, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON REPRESENTATIVE SHAREHOLDER LITIGATION (Sean Griffith et al. eds., forthcoming 2018)
(manuscript at 7).
49
Audra L. Boone et al., Merger Negotiations in the Shadow of Judicial Appraisal 14 (Indiana Legal
Studies, Working Paper No. 381, 2018).
50
See Olivetti Underwood Corp. v. Jacques Coe & Co., 217 A.2d 683, 686–87 (1966). For the financial
community’s understanding, see Elena Berton, Hedge Funds Vex a Shire Takeover of Transkaryotic, WALL
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funds to focus specifically on appraisal rights, and in recent years these funds
have raised billions of dollars from investors.51 They have been responsible for
most of the value at stake in appraisal during the recent boom of activity.52
B. The Empirical Research on Appraisal Rights and M&A
As appraisal activity has increased, so has scholarly interest in the topic.53
Our papers were the first to document the rise in appraisal activity in the early
part of this decade.54 A succession of papers have since examined two critical
research questions involving appraisal: First, in which cases are stockholders
invoking their appraisal rights?55 Second, how, if at all, does the threat of
appraisal affect the deal market?56
The first question involves whether stockholders are abusing the right to
dissent or whether instead they are targeting the “right” transactions—those with
markers of opportunistic behavior on the part of management. What kinds of
transactions, in other words, attract dissenting stockholders? Does appraisal
litigation resemble the classic class action strike suit—a scattershot attack on the
M&A market in search of quick settlements and a favorable interest rate on any
judgment? Or do stockholders instead focus their attention on deals that merit
additional scrutiny?
Thus far, empirical work on appraisal has overwhelmingly pointed to the
latter. In our previous work, we consistently found that two factors were
STREET J. (Aug. 17, 2005, 12:01 AM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112423543569114987 (“Delaware
corporate law allows all shareholders—even those who bought shares just before the vote on a takeover—to
seek an independent valuation in court if they reckon the price being offered for their stock is inadequate, even
if a majority approve the takeover.”). This basic idea has been affirmed by more recent cases. See In re Appraisal
of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 66825, at *1 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (holding that petitioner
who acquired stock after the announcement of the merger was entitled to pursue appraisal); Merion Capital L.P.
v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 67586, at *6 (Del. Ch. Jan. 5, 2015) (same).
51
See Steven Davidoff Solomon, Delaware Courts Pause on the Deal Price Do-Over, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
19, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/20/business/dealbook/delaware-courts-pause-on-the-deal-pricedo-over.html.
52
Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1572–73.
53
See, e.g., Boone et al., supra note 49; Scott Callahan et al., Appraisal Arbitrage and Shareholder Value,
J.L. FIN. & ACCT. (forthcoming 2018) (manuscript at 2); Choi & Talley, supra note 28; Wei Jiang et al.,
Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy or Litigation Arbitrage, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 698 (2016); Jonathan Kalodimos
& Clark Lundberg, Shareholder Rights in Mergers and Acquisitions: Are Appraisal Rights Being Abused?, 22
FIN. RESEARCH LETTERS 53, 53 (2017); Lawrence A. Hamermesh & Michael L. Wachter, Finding the Right
Balance in Appraisal Litigation: Deal Price, Deal Process, and Synergies, 73 BUS. LAW. 961 (2018).
54
See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1553; Korsmo & Myers, The Structure of
Stockholder Litigation: When Do Merits Matter?, supra note 14, at 829.
55
See supra note 53.
56
Id.
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associated with transactions attracting dissenting stockholders: a merger
premium that is abnormally low and insider participation in the transaction.57
Since then, work by Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei, and Randall Thomas has
confirmed that same finding.58 They found that going-private transactions and
deals with lower premia both increase the likelihood of appraisal.59 They
interpret their findings as follows: “[P]etitioners seem to target deals with
characteristics that are most likely to be tainted by conflicts of interest, such as
going-private deals, minority squeeze outs, and short-form M&A with low
premiums.”60 They also examined the effect of the statutory interest rate and
concluded that the 2016 interest rate reform was “very likely to reduce the
incidence of strike suits.”61
Two other financial economists—Johnathan Kalodimos and Clark
Lundberg—examined this same question of which transactions are targeted.62
Using a matched sample methodology, they confirm the low premium effect:
The lower the premium, the greater the chance of appraisal.63 They do not,
however, find an effect associated with insider transactions.64 They find two
other interesting effects. “Busy boards”—where a majority of outside directors
have more than three directorships, used in the literature as a proxy for
inattention—are more likely to attract dissenting stockholders.65 And they
examine the stock price reactions of acquirers, finding that abnormal positive
returns in the window surrounding the deal announcement are higher in
transactions targeted for appraisal.66 Kalodimos and Lundberg interpret this and
their other findings as “consistent with petitioned acquisitions occurring at
prices below fundamental value and is not consistent with appraisal rights
generally functioning as an abusive channel for opportunistic investors.”67
The second research question involves the effect of appraisal rights on the
M&A market more generally. Even if appraisal rights are being used in ways

57
Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1596; Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern
Appraisal Litigation, supra note 15, at 290–91.
58
See Jiang et al., supra note 53, at 699–700.
59
Id. at 718.
60
Id. at 727.
61
Id.
62
Kalodimos & Lundberg, supra note 53, at 54.
63
Id. at 54–57.
64
Id. at 54.
65
Id. at 56.
66
Id.
67
Id.
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tied to underlying merits, it still could be the case that the exercise of these rights
has a deleterious impact on the deal market.
In a recent paper, Audra Boone, Brian Broughman, and Antonio Macias
examined this question.68 Their research looked for changes in the deal market
in response to events that strengthened or weakened appraisal rights in
Delaware.69 They found that, “Delaware targets receive[d] higher acquisition
premiums . . . following events that strengthen[ed] the appraisal remedy . . . .”70
They found no evidence that bidders lowered their prices in response to the
threat of appraisal.71 They also looked at arbitrage spreads post-announcement.
The spread in deals with no appraisal petition was 6%—meaning that target
company stock trades, on average, at a 6% discount to the negotiated merger
price immediately following the deal’s announcement.72 In deals with dissenting
stockholders, however, the spread was statistically indistinguishable from
zero.73 In effect, appraisal specialists bid the trading price up, paying the full
merger price. These empirical findings suggest two conclusions. First, the
response of acquisition premia indicates that, contrary to the expressed fears of
some practitioners, the increasing use of appraisal has not injured minority
stockholders by causing acquirers to “hold back” value in anticipation of
appraisal. Second, the elimination of the post-announcement spread suggests
that appraisal arbitrageurs are providing a direct benefit to stockholders who do
not seek appraisal, allowing them to obtain the full merger price immediately.
Perhaps more importantly, the same authors further found that the likelihood
of Delaware firms becoming acquisition targets increases following events that
strengthened appraisal.74 This suggests that increasing levels of appraisal
activity do not deter deal-making. And, crucially, they found that deal planners
were more likely to use a formal auction as a market check when appraisal is
strengthened.75 As they conclude: “[O]ur analysis suggests that bidders protect
themselves against threat of appraisal, not through contractual terms that would
allow the bidder to walk away from the deal . . . but rather by increasing their
upfront bid and improving the price-setting process . . . .”76 In other words,
appraisal appears to be having the effect we predicted, giving managers an ex
68
69
70
71
72
73
74
75
76

Boone et al., supra note 49, at 1.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 4.
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ante incentive to employ a better deal process and obtain a better price. In sum,
they conclude that “a strong appraisal regime increases returns to target
shareholders.”77
Another recent paper on this topic, by Scott Callahan, Darius Palia, and Eric
Talley, finds that deal premia are higher in appraisal-eligible transactions, even
controlling for the tax status of the deal.78 This result is consistent with the
reserve price model that Choi and Talley developed in a separate paper.79
Callahan, Palia, and Talley also find evidence that 2007 changes to the appraisal
regime increased the premia associated with appraisal eligible deals.80 They note
that the Boone, Broughman, and Macias paper—which makes different
methodological choices—generates consistent results.81 In their view, the
consistency of the findings strengthens the shared conclusion: “we view the two
papers to be highly complementary and ultimately symbiotic robustness checks
against one another.”82
C. The Continuing Policy Debate
The empirical findings are consistent with our earlier conjecture that
appraisal rights play a salutary but small role in public company M&A.83 Despite
the positive results of empirical investigations of appraisal activity,
practitioners—particularly an influential group of New York deal advisers—
have continually sounded the alarm bell about appraisal, presenting it as a threat
to the deal market and a new front in nuisance litigation.84
In 2015, a group of seven law firms that have active M&A practices
protested that Delaware, in proposing two prophylactic reforms to the appraisal
statute, did not go far enough.85 The firms wanted reforms that would result in
the elimination of appraisal arbitrage.86 The benefits of their reform agenda
would be to “reduce the unseemly claims-buying that is rampant and serves no
legitimate equitable or other purpose, but threatens to undermine transactional
77

Id. at 5.
Callahan et al., supra note 53 (manuscript at 36).
79
See Choi & Talley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 3).
80
Callahan et al., supra note 53 (manuscript at 28).
81
Id. (manuscript at 7).
82
Id.
83
See Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra note 15, at 282–83.
84
Id. at 309.
85
Letter from Cravath, Swaine & Moore et al. to Council of the Corporate Law Section of the Delaware
State Bar Association & Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Professor, Widener’s Institute of Delaware Corporate Law
(Apr. 1, 2015) (on file with authors).
86
Id. at 2.
78
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certainty and reduce value to shareholders of Delaware corporations as
acquirers, particularly in leveraged transactions, may be forced to factor the
enhanced appraisal risk into their calculations.”87 The bar committee responsible
for proposing amendments to Delaware’s corporate statute considered the firms’
proposal but declined to endorse it.88
Criticism from deal advisers continued. A memorandum from Wachtell,
Lipton, Rosen & Katz, for example, suggested that with appraisal “there is a
substantial risk that public stockholders lose out—whether by losing a value
maximizing deal altogether or through value leakage to appraisal
arbitrageurs.”89 Practitioners complained about appraisal decisions from the
Court of Chancery, suggesting that the possibility of appraisal liability was
“terrifying.”90 In 2017, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce knocked Delaware out
of its customary position in first place on its ranking of state liability systems,91
and some observers suggested that the fall “reflect[ed] Delaware actions in some
well-known appraisal cases.”92
D. DFC Global, Dell, and Other Developments
Thanks to the influx of appraisal cases, the Delaware courts have had the
opportunity to confront new issues—and to revisit old ones. Dell and DFC
Global constitute the Delaware Supreme Court’s first extended treatment of the
modern practice of appraisal.93

87

Id. at 3.
See 2015 Explanatory Memorandum Prepared by the Council of the Corporation Law Section of the
Delaware State Bar Association (unpublished memorandum) (on file with authors).
89
Martin Lipton & Theodore N. Mirvis, Delaware Court of Chancery Appraises Fully-Shopped
Company at Nearly 30% Over Merger Price, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 3,
2016),
https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2016/06/03/delaware-court-of-chancery-appraises-fully-shoppedcompany-at-nearly-30-over-merger-price/. For another Wachtell memo that offers a tendentious view of
appraisal, see Theodore N. Mirvis, Delaware Appraisal at a Crossroads?, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP.
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (June 20, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/06/20/delaware-appraisal-ata-crossroads/.
90
Chelsea Naso, 4 Takeaways from the 2017 Tulane Corporate Law Institute, LAW360 (Apr. 3, 2017,
8:52 PM) (quoting Blackstone chief legal officer who described the Dell ruling as “terrifying”),
https://www.law360.com/articles/908947.
91
See U.S. CHAMBER INST. FOR LEGAL REFORM, 2017 LAWSUIT CLIMATE SURVEY: RANKING THE STATES
(2017),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/pdfs/Harris-2017-Executive-Summary-FINAL.pdf;
Ning Chiu, Delaware’s Loss of Top Spot for Lawsuit Climate, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. GOVERNANCE & FIN.
REG. (Oct. 2, 2017), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2017/10/02/delawares-loss-of-top-spot-for-lawsuitclimate/.
92
Chiu, supra note 91.
93
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017); DFC Glob. Corp.
v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
88
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1. The Delaware Court of Chancery
Well before the rise of appraisal arbitrage, the Court of Chancery considered
whether and when the negotiated merger price should stand as the statutory fair
value in an appraisal proceeding. In 2004, then-Vice Chancellor Strine held that
a negotiated price reflected the fair value of a company when the merger
“resulted from a competitive and fair auction, which followed a more-thanadequate sales process and involved the broad dissemination of confidential
information to a large number of prospective buyers.”94
In a string of opinions beginning in 2013, the Court of Chancery found that
the fair value of a public company was equal to the price negotiated by the
board.95 The decisions that attracted the most attention, however, were two—
involving DFC Global and Dell—where the Court of Chancery found that the
fair value was higher than the transaction price.96 While each opinion dealt with
a variety of issues, the fundamental question on appeal in each case was how
much weight, if any, to afford the negotiated transaction price.97
a. Dell
The transaction at issue in the Dell case was a 2013 management buyout,
where Michael Dell, the founder and CEO, teamed up with the private equity
firm Silver Lake Partners to acquire the company for $13.75 per share.98 At trial,
the company argued that the transaction price was the best evidence of Dell’s
fair value.99 The Court of Chancery, however, concluded that the deal price “is
certainly a relevant factor, but it is not the best evidence of the Company’s fair
value.”100 Instead, the court relied on a DCF analysis, finding that the fair value
of Dell was $17.62 per share.101

94

Union Ill. 1995 Inv. Ltd. P’ship v. Union Fin. Grp., Ltd., 847 A.2d 340, 358 (Del. Ch. 2004).
See, e.g., In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., No. 10782-VCS, 2017 WL 2303599, at *2 (Del. Ch. May
26, 2017); Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 7324170, at *1, *11
(Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016); Merion Capital L.P. v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 616477, at *1
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); Merlin Partners L.P. v. AutoInfo, Inc., No. 8509-VCN, 2015 WL 2069417, at *14
(Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, Inc., No. 8173-VCG, 2015 WL 399726, at *16–17
(Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., No. 6844-VCG, 2013 WL 5878807, at *1 (Del.
Ch. Nov. 1, 2013).
96
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 349; In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *36
(Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
97
Dell, 177 A.3d at 5; DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 378.
98
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *18, *20.
99
Id. at *22.
100
Id.
101
Id. at *1.
95
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The court analyzed the informational content of the transaction price by
evaluating the quality of the forces that produced it.102 It separated the inquiry
into two parts by time, first examining the market dynamics in the period before
Dell signed the merger agreement, and then those in the post-signing phase.103
During the pre-signing phase, several factors led the court to question the
reliability of the sales process.104 First, the court noted that the management
group faced no meaningful competitive pressure during its negotiations.105 This
was a serious limitation on the sales process.106 The special committee and its
financial advisers approached no strategic buyers during the pre-signing phase,
not even the obvious targets.107 Indeed, the financial adviser, Evercore, received
a contingency payment only if it secured a deal during the post-signing phase,
and Evercore naturally discouraged the committee from contacting a wider
universe of buyers until then.108 Instead, during the pre-signing phase the
company dealt only with two financial sponsors, who both relied on the same
valuation approach.109
Second, the court observed that the company’s stock price was not a useful
reservation price in negotiations. This was so because of what the court
described as an “anti-bubble” in Dell’s public stock price, drawing on behavioral
economics.110 Stock analysts had no confidence in the future of the company,
which kept the price down, and this affected the negotiations by anchoring
perceptions of the company’s value.111
The third weakness identified by the court in the pre-signing phase focused
on the identity of the handful of potential bidders the special committee
contacted: financial sponsors, or private equity firms. Private equity firms invest
102

Id. at *25.
Id. at *36–38.
104
Id. at *29.
105
Id. at *36 (noting that there was a lack of pre-signing competition for the management buyout group).
106
Id. at *37 (“Without a meaningful source of competition, the Committee lacked the most powerful tool
that a seller can use to extract a portion of the bidder’s anticipated surplus.”).
107
See id. (“HP was the obvious choice, and Evercore would later estimate that a deal between the
Company and HP could generate between $3 and 4 billion in annual cost savings.”).
108
See id. at *11 (“The Committee discussed recent news leaks about Mr. Dell’s exploration of an MBO.
In response to the leaks, Blackstone Management Partners LLC had reached out to Evercore about engaging
with the Company. Evercore advised the Committee to wait for the go-shop before engaging Blackstone or
soliciting additional bids. The petitioners observe correctly that Evercore would earn a contingency fee only
from offers produced during the go-shop period, so it had an incentive to prefer that any additional bidder emerge
during that phase.”).
109
Id. at *30–31.
110
See id. at *36.
111
See id.
103
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on behalf of their limited partners and must earn a gross profit that is sufficiently
high to pay themselves and deliver their limited partners a market-clearing
return.112 They also rely heavily on debt in acquiring companies, and so debt
market conditions can affect their bids.113 A private equity firm’s bid is driven,
in other words, by a valuation model that includes a gross profit that likely
exceeds a public company’s cost of capital by a substantial margin. In Dell, the
special committee itself appeared to have employed this valuation model in its
negotiations.114 For these reasons, the court concluded that the dynamic in the
pre-signing phase was not sufficient to demonstrate that the negotiated price was
equal to the fair value of the company.115
The competitive dynamics in the post-signing phase, likewise, were not
sufficient to prove that the deal price reflected the fair value of the company.116
The merger agreement included a conventional “go-shop” provision and a
termination fee that was reduced during the go-shop period.117 During that goshop period, two higher bids emerged, both from financial sponsors, and in
response to one of them, the management group increased its price by 2%.118
The obvious question—which the court confronted—was: If the company was
worth more than the management group’s bid, why would some bidder not have
bested it again during the go-shop period? As a threshold matter, the Delaware
Court of Chancery concluded that the possibility for a competing bid to emerge
during the go-shop period was enough to rule out a large a gap between the
negotiated price and fair value.119 But Vice Chancellor Laster avoided the fallacy
that the mere absence of a topping bid demonstrates the adequacy of the
negotiated price.120

112

See id. at *29.
See id. (“What the sponsor is willing to pay diverges from fair value because of (i) the financial
sponsor’s need to achieve IRRs of 20% or more to satisfy its own investors and (ii) limits on the amount of
leverage that the company can support and the sponsor can use to finance the deal.”).
114
See id. at *31 (“[T]he Committee negotiated without determining the value of its best alternative to a
negotiated acquisition.”).
115
Id. at *37.
116
Id. at *38.
117
Id. at *12.
118
Id. at *37.
119
Id. at *44 (“The market data is sufficient to exclude the possibility, advocated by the petitioners’ expert,
that the Merger undervalued the Company by $23 billion. Had a value disparity of that magnitude existed, then
HP or another technology firm would have emerged to acquire the Company on the cheap.”).
120
See infra note 252.
113
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The go-shop suffered from a number of infirmities.121 For one thing, the
court noted that the Dell transaction was twenty-five times larger than any other
deal that had ever been topped post-signing. The court suggested that “the
magnitude of the task” of participating in the go-shop—in particular, the need
to perform due diligence on such a large and complex target in an abbreviated
time frame—may have had “a chilling effect on other parties,” particularly in
the context of a management buyout, where the insiders would naturally have
an informational advantage.122
Additionally, private equity firms are notoriously uncompetitive with each
another. As the deal market commentator Andrew Ross Sorkin observed, any
bidder who sought to compete with the management team’s offer would “appear
to have made a hostile bid.”123 And for private equity firms, as Sorkin
emphasized, that simply is not done: “Private equity firms have spent the last 25
years avoiding anything that could make them perceived as hostile because they
typically want management teams to want to do business with them.”124 The
court noted that leading private equity firms—including the one that teamed up
with the CEO and the supposed competing bidders—agreed to pay a combined
$325 million to settle allegations that they conspired to avoid competing with
one another in an effort to keep deal prices low.125
The relationship between Michael Dell and Dell Inc. figured prominently in
the court’s analysis. Given that he was a net buyer of shares in the transaction,
any higher bid would cost him substantial money out of pocket, increasing the
chances it would be regarded as hostile.126 For the same reason, Michael Dell
“would have a financial incentive to push the deal price down rather than up.”127
His unique relationship with the company and knowledge of its business also

121
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *44 (“What the market data does not exclude is an
underpricing of a smaller magnitude, given that all of the participants constructed their bids based on a leveraged
financing model and were limited by its constraints.”); see id. at *39 (noting the court’s reliance here on
unrebutted expert testimony from the petitioner’s expert on deal process; the respondent did not put forward an
expert on the topic).
122
Id. at *42.
123
Andrew Ross Sorkin, A $25 Million Question Over a Bid for Dell, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 1, 2013, 9:26 PM),
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/01/a-25-million-charade-over-a-bid-for-dell/.
124
Id.
125
William Alden, K.K.R., Blackstone and TPG Private Equity Firms Agree to Settle Lawsuit on
Collusion, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 7, 2014, 9:18 AM) https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/08/07/k-k-r-agrees-tosettle-lawsuit-on-private-equity-collusion/.
126
See Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 22).
127
Id.
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complicated the competitive landscape.128 While the special committee
attempted to make him available to alternative bidders, the informational
asymmetry between Mr. Dell’s group and any competing bidder, especially a
financial bidder, was a “powerful disincentive . . . to get involved.”129 Likewise,
the relationship between Mr. Dell and the company’s customers may have been
an important asset to the company, which other bidders could not replicate,
inhibiting the post-signing process.130 The court concluded that “in light of the
nature of the competition that took place during the go-shop phase, the 2% bump
was not sufficient to prove that the Final Merger Consideration was the best
evidence of fair value.”131
As an alternative to the transaction price, the court engaged in a DCF
analysis that generated a value of $17.62 per share.132 It noted that this result
comported with the testimony and evidence at trial.133 The court observed that
private equity buyers—the only type of buyer that the committee approached—
could not have paid such a price “because of their IRR [(internal rate of return)]
requirements and the Company’s inability to support the necessary levels of
leverage.”134 Why did a strategic bidder not pay such a price, if the company
was worth that? The court noted that, “[g]iven the massive integration risk
inherent in such a deal, it is not entirely surprising that HP did not engage and
that no one else came forward.”135 In other words, even though no single bidder
was actually in a position to pay that much, the court was comfortable that the
DCF value was realistic as a measure of Dell’s stand-alone value as a going
concern.136
In settling on a final valuation, the court decided to give no weight to the
negotiated price. The sales process had “functioned imperfectly as a price
discovery tool, both during the pre-signing and post-signing phases,”137 and the
128
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *42 (“As the Company’s founder and longtime
CEO, Mr. Dell knew more about the Company than anyone else. Before any bidder would become involved,
they had to have a strategy for dealing with Mr. Dell’s superior knowledge.”).
129
Id. at *43; see also Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 18) (noting that the evidence suggested
“that HP did not perceive a pathway to success in a bidding contest against Michael Dell, in which it would have
45 days and Michael Dell would have had decades.”).
130
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *44 (“Mr. Dell’s unique value and his affiliation
with the Buyout Group were negative factors that inhibited the effectiveness of the go-shop process.”).
131
Id. at *39.
132
Id. at *51.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Id.
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court found it impossible to determine the extent of the mispricing.138 Instead,
the court relied exclusively on the DCF methodology.139
b. DFC Global
DFC Global was a payday lender that had been acquired by a private equity
fund called Lone Star in 2014.140 As in Dell, the negotiated merger price and
what weight to afford it figured prominently in the Court of Chancery’s
decision.141 The court observed that relying on the deal price as a source of fair
value made sense “only when the market conditions leading to the transaction
[were] conducive to achieving a fair price.”142 As a payday lender, DFC Global
was facing the threat of heavy regulation at the time of the merger. This
regulatory uncertainty undermined the court’s confidence in both the transaction
price and the company’s financial projections—critical inputs for valuing the
business in a DCF analysis.143 As a result, the court decided to blend the merger
price together with valuations derived from other methodologies.144 The
resulting value of $10.21 per share was a premium of about 7.5% over the deal
price.145
At the time of the acquisition, the company faced a risk that regulators in its
two major geographic markets, the United States and the United Kingdom,
might impose new regulatory mandates and prohibitions.146 The effect of
increasing regulations on the company’s business, however, was uncertain.147
New regulations might have diminished the profitability of its business.148
Conversely, they might have improved the company’s position, if less

138
Id. (“Because it is impossible to quantify the exact degree of the sale process mispricing, this decision
does not give weight to the Final Merger Consideration.”).
139
Id.
140
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016),
rev’d sub nom. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
141
Id. at *20–21.
142
Id. at *1.
143
Id. at *2, *21–22.
144
Id. at *1.
145
See id.
146
Id. at *2.
147
See id. (“One of the key risks DFC faced was the potential for changes to those regulations that could
increase the cost of doing business or otherwise limit the company’s opportunities.”).
148
See id. at *21 (“[A]t the time of its sale, DFC was navigating turbulent regulatory waters that imposed
considerable uncertainty on the company’s future profitability, and even its viability. Some of its competitors
faced similar challenges. The potential outcome could have been dire, leaving DFC unable to operate its
fundamental businesses, or could have been very positive, leaving DFC’s competitors crippled and allowing
DFC to gain market dominance.”).
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established firms had trouble bearing the regulatory costs.149 The magnitude of
the risk left the court skeptical of each valuation methodology it considered: a
DCF analysis, a comparable companies analysis, and the transaction price.150
The court observed that conditions were generally right to look to the deal
price. The merger was struck with a third-party at arm’s length; the sales process,
though fitful, lasted two years; and the financial adviser to DFC Global
contacted both strategic buyers and private equity buyers.151 For these reasons,
the court concluded that there was “a reasonable level of confidence that the deal
price [could] fairly be used as one measure of DFC’s value.”152
The court, however, declined to give exclusive weight to the negotiated
price.153 It offered two reasons for its skepticism, both of which echoed some of
the Dell court’s misgivings. First, Chancellor Bouchard pointed out that the
transaction occurred at a moment when the company’s performance “appeared
to be in a trough, with future performance depending on the outcome of
regulatory decision-making that was largely out of the company’s control.”154
The implication was that the transaction had been opportunistically timed to take
advantage of the regulatory uncertainty.
Second, Chancellor Bouchard noted the buyer’s “status as a financial
sponsor [that] focused its attention on achieving a certain [IRR] and on reaching
a deal within its financing constraints, rather than on DFC’s fair value.”155 The
buyer here reduced its offer when its available financing options changed,156
indicating that the transaction price was driven at least partly by the borrowing
capacity of the buyer rather than the fair value of the target company.
The court equivocated about the thoroughness of the sales process.157 On the
one hand, it observed that the buyer secured a critical period of negotiating
exclusivity and also pressured the company into the deal with an exploding
offer.158 On the other hand, the court drew “confidence in the robustness of the
market for DFC” from the extended sales process, the public announcement of

149
150
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Supra note 148.
See In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., 2016 WL 3753123, at *21–23.
Id. at *21.
Id.
Id. at *22.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id. at *21–23.
See id. at *23.
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the transaction, and a termination fee that “was reasonable and bifurcated to
allow for a reduced fee in the event of a superior proposal.”159
In considering what weight to afford three sources of information on the
value of DFC Global—the deal price, a DCF analysis, and a comparable
companies analysis—the court lamented that “all three metrics suffer from
various limitations” but ultimately concluded that each offered some “insight
into DFC’s value.”160 Moreover, the Chancellor noted that “all three of them
[fell] within a reasonable range.”161 As a result, he weighted the three approaches
equally and arrived at a valuation of $10.21.162
2. The Delaware Supreme Court
The two decisions in the Court of Chancery attracted significant media
attention, especially Dell.163 Some commentators struggled to understand how
stockholders could have been underpaid if no one had done anything “wrong.”164
In his column, Andrew Ross Sorkin observed that “[t]he decision [was] sending
shudders all over Wall Street and the boardrooms of corporate America, because
the court, in effect, overruled ‘the market.’”165 Practitioners likewise saw
darkness on the horizon, suggesting that “the implications of the [Dell] decision,
if not narrowed or reversed on appeal, are potentially far reaching.”166 The dean
of the M&A bar, Martin Lipton, wrote that private equity firms will face “routine
appraisal exposure in Delaware, no matter how robust the auction, and therefore
seek out alternative transaction structures to cap and price their risk (or exit the
market entirely).”167 Delaware, the whispers went, had let something get out of
159

Id.
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
E.g., Michael J. de la Merced, Dell Buyout Deal Shortchanged Shareholders, Court Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(May 31, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/01/business/dealbook/dell-buyout-deal-shortchangedshareholders-court-rules.html.
164
Roger Parloff, How Michael Dell Shortchanged Shareholders While Doing Nothing Wrong, FORTUNE
(June 2, 2016) http://fortune.com/2016/06/02/michael-dell-shortchanged-shareholders; see Andrew Ross
Sorkin, Who Decides ‘Fair Value?’ In Dell’s Case, a Judge, N.Y. TIMES (June 6, 2016), https://www.nytimes.
com/2016/06/07/ (“What’s so peculiar about the [Dell] decision is that the judge found no chicanery and still
didn’t think the price was fair . . . .”); see also Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 5) (noting that
“[b]rouhaha ensued,” and providing examples).
165
Sorkin, supra note 164.
166
SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, IN RE: APPRAISAL OF DELL INC. 1 (2016).
167
Sorkin, supra note 164; M&A Governance 2017, WHO’S WHO LEGAL (May 2017),
http://whoswholegal.com/news/analysis/article/33784/Gabriel-R-Bustamante-Brambila-Vera-Asociados-TheLatest-Legal-News-Research-Legal-Profiles-Whos-Who-Legal/; David Lat, The Marty Lipton Fan Blog,
ABOVE L. (Sept. 27, 2007, 12:30 PM), https://abovethelaw.com/2007/09/the-marty-lipton-fan-blog/.
160
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hand, something that could only be fixed on appeal.168 Although the Dell opinion
was issued earlier in the Court of Chancery, it was the DFC Global case that
arrived first at the Delaware Supreme Court.169 The Supreme Court issued its
opinion in DFC Global in August 2017, reversing the judgment below, and
fulfilling Lipton’s hopes.170 Four months later it did the same thing in Dell.171
a. DFC Global
In the Delaware Supreme Court, DFC Global argued that the court should
establish a presumption that trial courts should defer to the negotiated
transaction price in an “arm’s-length, conflict-free transaction.”172 This
argument prompted two competing amicus briefs from academics.173 The first
came from seven corporate law professors, including William Carney, a
distinguished retired Emory professor who has written extensively on appraisal
rights.174 That brief supported the company’s position, encouraging the court to
defer presumptively to the transaction price where it arises from “an arm’slength auction process.”175 A competing brief argued against such a
presumption. The signatories to this brief included not only corporate law
professors but also financial economists and experts in auction design, including
the 2007 Nobel Prize winner Eric Maskin.176 These amici argued that any
categorical rule would be “a trifecta of bad law, bad economics, and bad
policy.”177 A presumption would be inconsistent with the statutory command to

168
See SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, supra note 166; Sorkin, supra note 164 (“The decision is sending
shudders all over Wall Street and the boardrooms of corporate America, because the court, in effect, overruled
‘the market.’”).
169
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1 (Del. 2017); DFC Glob. Corp.
v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017); In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *1 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016); In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL
3186538, at *1 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
170
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 351.
171
Dell, 177 A.3d at 1, 6.
172
See Appellant’s Opening Brief at 1, DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346
(Del. 2017) (No. 518, 2016).
173
Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal, DFC Glob.
Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (No. 518, 2016); Brief of Law, Economics
and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners-Appellees and Affirmance, DFC
Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (No. 518, 2016).
174
Brief of Law and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of Reversal at Exhibit 1,
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017) (No. 518, 2016).
175
Id. at 1.
176
Brief of Law, Economics and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of PetitionersAppellees and Affirmance at Exhibit 1, DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del.
2017) (No. 518, 2016).
177
Id. at 2.
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“take into account all relevant factors” in determining fair value, and it would
also ignore the obvious possibility that “a facially disinterested process can still
render a price falling short of fair value.”178 Additionally, the brief marshaled
auction theory to argue that “the credible threat of [an] appraisal” award that is
untethered to the merger price would improve the M&A market.179
The doctrinal trouble for the company’s argument on appeal was that the
Supreme Court had already addressed precisely this issue in Golden Telecom,
its then-most recent statement on appraisal.180 There, the court rejected any idea
of a presumption181 emphasizing that the statute called on the Court of Chancery
to complete an “independent evaluation of the ‘fair value’” of the company, in
which it must consider “all relevant factors.”182 The statute requires that the
court, and not the parties, determine the value of the company, and this is so
“even in the face of a pristine, unchallenged transactional process.”183
The Supreme Court stuck by Golden Telecom, at least de jure, declining to
adopt any presumption in favor of the transaction price.184 But the Supreme
Court nevertheless strongly indicated that the Court of Chancery should treat the
transaction price as the best evidence of the company’s value.185 At the
beginning of its opinion, the Supreme Court emphasized that the Court of
Chancery made the following findings of fact:
i) the transaction resulted from a robust market search that lasted
approximately two years in which financial and strategic buyers had
an open opportunity to buy without inhibition of deal protections; ii)
the company was purchased by a third party in an arm’s length sale;
and iii) there was no hint of self-interest that compromised the market
check.186

While disclaiming any presumption, the Supreme Court indicated as follows:
[U]nder the conditions found by the Court of Chancery, economic
principles suggest that the best evidence of fair value was the deal
price, as it resulted from an open process, informed by robust
public information, and easy access to deeper, non-public

178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

Id.
See id. at 11, 13.
See Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT L.P., 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010).
Id.
Id. at 217–18.
Id. at 218.
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 348–49.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 349.
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information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a
profit had a chance to bid.187
Throughout the opinion, the Supreme Court repeatedly emphasized the primacy
of the transaction price.188 The opinion’s focus on the deal price was so emphatic
that seasoned observers described it as tantamount to “a bright-line rule
requiring deference to the deal price.”189
In the same vein, the Supreme Court also put forth a novel conception of the
purpose of appraisal, one that dramatically reformulated the historic fair value
inquiry. The traditional formulation is that “the stockholder is entitled to be paid
for that which has been taken from him, viz., his proportionate interest in a going
concern.”190 In its place, the DFC Global court suggested that “the purpose of
an appraisal is . . . to make sure that [target stockholders] receive fair
compensation for their shares in the sense that it reflects what they deserve to
receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm’s-length
transaction.”191 As discussed below, this formulation ignores the alternative of
the target remaining independent. But lurking in this formulation is perhaps
something even beyond a presumption: an equivalency. If the fair value standard
is “fair compensation,” and “fair compensation” means whatever a stockholder
would get in an arm’s-length transaction, then the consideration in an arm’slength transaction is, necessarily, fair value.
While the Supreme Court disclaimed any presumptive deference to the deal
price, it nonetheless reversed the trial court’s valuation.192 The Supreme Court
concluded on its own reading of the facts that, even in the absence of a
presumption, the negotiated price was the best indication of the fair value of the
company, despite the trial court’s misgivings about the deal process.193

187
Id. at 349, 366 (“[W]e have little quibble with the economic argument that the price of a merger that
results from a robust market check, against the back drop of a rich information base and a welcoming
environment for potential buyers, is probative of the company’s fair value.”); see id. at 366 (“[O]ur refusal to
craft a statutory presumption in favor of the deal price when certain conditions pertain does not in any way signal
our ignorance to the economic reality that the sale value resulting from a robust market check will often be the
most reliable evidence of fair value, and that second-guessing the value arrived upon by the collective views of
many sophisticated parties with a real stake in the matter is hazardous.”).
188
See, e.g., id. at 370.
189
T. Brad Davey, DFC Global: A Few Observations from Delaware, in 2017 YEAR IN REVIEW: THE
STATE OF APPRAISAL IN THE DELAWARE COURTS 8 (Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP ed., 2017).
190
Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye, 74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950); see, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 684
A.2d 289, 298 (Del. 1996); Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (citation omitted).
191
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 371.
192
Id. at 351.
193
Id. at 370–71.
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In reversing the trial court’s valuation, the Supreme Court rejected both of
the reasons that the trial court had relied upon when giving the merger price only
a one-third weight.194 The first was the Court of Chancery’s suggestion that the
company’s stock price was in a “trough” at the time of the transaction.195 The
Supreme Court noted that price movements in the target company stock were
the result of changes in the regulatory environment, and that environment was
not a “trough” but was simply a harsh reality from which the company could not
escape.196 To the Supreme Court, the same regulatory uncertainty necessarily
also affected the bidders’ valuation and thus, for the court, was not a reason to
doubt the transactional pricing.197
The second reason the Court of Chancery offered for its skepticism of the
deal price was that the buyer, as a private equity fund, was focused only on
achieving certain internal rates of return and staying within leverage limitations,
not on the company’s fair value.198 The Supreme Court rejected what it called a
“private equity carve out.”199 The buyer’s status as a private equity sponsor—in
the business of hitting internal return targets for its limited partners that
necessitate paying low prices up front—was not relevant.200 Instead, the
touchstone was whether the price resulted from “a competitive process,”201 and
the Supreme Court laid special emphasis on the trial court’s finding that there
had been no conflicts of interest in the transaction.202 The idea that a private
equity buyer necessarily pays a price below fair value, the Supreme Court said,
is not “grounded in economic literature or this record.”203 Whatever flaws there
might have been in the sales process, they were insufficient, in the eyes of the
Supreme Court, to call the deal price into question.204
The Supreme Court offered a number of reasons for rejecting the idea of a
bright-line presumption in favor of the deal price.205 The court echoed the
194

Id. at 372, 388.
Id. at 372.
196
Id. at 372, 381.
197
Id. at 375.
198
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *22 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).
199
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 350.
200
Id. (“[T]he fact that a financial buyer may demand a certain rate of return on its investment in exchange
for undertaking the risk of an acquisition does not mean that the price it is willing to pay is not a meaningful
indication of fair value.”).
201
Id.
202
Id. at 373.
203
Id. at 350.
204
Id. at 376 (“[T]he record does not include the sorts of flaws in the sale process that could lead one to
reasonably suspect that the ultimate price paid by Lone Star was not reflective of DFC’s fair value.”).
205
Id. at 363.
195
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Golden Telecom anxiety that any presumption would run afoul of the statute.206
It also acknowledged the difficulty in crafting a general test that would capture
the “precise pre-conditions” for invoking such a presumption.207 And the court
observed that a presumption was unnecessary because of the “proven record of
our Court of Chancery in exercising its discretion to give the deal price
predominant, and indeed exclusive weight, when it determines, based on the
precise facts before it that led to the transaction, that the deal price is the most
reliable evidence of fair value.”208 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court remanded
the case with very clear instructions to the Court of Chancery that the fair value
should be equal to the deal price in the case before it.209
The outcome in the DFC Global appeal was hardly a surprise,210 but
commentators took the reversal as a strong endorsement of the idea that the
transaction price should be the best evidence of a company’s fair value when the
deal is struck at arm’s length and the sales process is “robust.”211 The opinion
may also have reflected a desire to relieve private equity funds of litigation
risk.212
b. Dell
Only a few months later, the Supreme Court issued its opinion in Dell,
reversing the Court of Chancery’s opinion and again strongly suggesting that the
206

Id. at 364; see also Golden Telecom, Inc. v. Glob. GT L.P., 11 A.3d 214, 218 (Del. 2010).
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 366.
208
Id.
209
Id. at 351 (“[T]he Chancellor should reassess the weight he chooses to afford various factors potentially
relevant to fair value, and he may conclude that his findings regarding the competitive process leading to the
transaction, when considered in light of other relevant factors, such as the views of the debt markets regarding
the company’s expected performance and the failure of the company to meet its revised projections, suggest that
the deal price was the most reliable indication of fair value.”).
210
See Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 5) (noting that the reversal “was generally unsurprising
in corporate law circles”).
211
E.g., ROPES & GRAY, DELAWARE SUPREME COURT PROVIDES GUIDANCE ON FACTORS TO CONSIDER IN
APPRAISAL VALUATION PROCEDURE IN CONTEXT OF DFC GLOBAL APPRAISAL ACTION 2 (2017) (“[I]ts reversal
of the Court of Chancery’s appraisal decision reaffirms the Delaware courts’ general view that the transaction
price resulting from a robust, conflict-free, and arm’s-length sales process will often be the most reliable
evidence of fair value of a company’s shares.”); SULLIVAN & CROMWELL LLP, DELAWARE SUPREME COURT
REVERSES DFC GLOBAL APPRAISAL DECISION 4 (2017) (the decision “reiterates the preeminence of the merger
consideration as an indicator of fair value”); see also Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 12)
(“Commentators called [DFC] a ‘presumption in everything but name,’ and I agree with that assessment.”).
212
Tom Hals, Delaware Court Reverses Closely Watched DFC Global Appraisal Ruling, REUTERS (Aug.
1, 2017, 1:36 PM) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-dfc-global-lone-star-ruling/delaware-court-reversesclosely-watched-dfc-global-appraisal-ruling-idUSKBN1AH4Y1 (“Wall Street dealmakers have warned that
Bouchard’s view made it difficult for private equity buyers to protect their deals from appraisal-seeking hedge
funds.”).
207
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most appropriate measure of a company’s fair value was the transaction price.
At bottom, the aspects of the sales process that troubled the Court of Chancery
simply did not worry the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court observed that, by
giving the deal price no weight in its fair value calculation, the Court of
Chancery ran afoul of “relevant, accepted financial principles.”213 Indeed, in the
view of the Supreme Court, the trial court had made a set of minimum factual
findings sufficient to conclude that the “the deal price deserved heavy, if not
dispositive, weight.”214 The trial court had made extensive factual findings, cited
to scholarly literature, and relied on an unrebutted deal process expert witness
who critiqued the sale process.215 In light of these features, the reversal in Dell
came as more of a surprise than it had for DFC Global.216
The Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Chancery had identified
three bases for assigning no weight to the deal price, and it rejected all three as
flawed.217 First, the Supreme Court dismissed the trial court’s concern that deal
negotiations were anchored downward by the company’s depressed stock
price.218 This argument, the Supreme Court said, “ignored the efficient market
hypothesis long endorsed by this Court.”219 Embracing none of the behavioral
insights of the trial court’s opinion, the Supreme Court found that the market in
Dell’s stock was not myopic so much as it was unconvinced that the company
had a bright future.220
Second, as in DFC Global, the Supreme Court rejected the idea that a
buyer’s status as a private equity firm had any bearing on whether the transaction
price was evidence of fair value.221 Any buyer, the Supreme Court observed,
would expect to hit an IRR with its investment, just like private equity buyers,
so the fact that private equity bidders had a higher cost of capital should not

213

Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 5 (Del. 2017).
Id. at 23.
215
Id. at 5–6, 15–18.
216
See Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 5–6, 6 n.2) (noting that the reversal “surprised (and
even shocked) some practitioners and commentators” and that an anonymous poll of what he calls a
“Respondent-friendly” crowd at a conference held at Kirkland & Ellis in May 2017 had found a strong majority
agreeing that Dell should be affirmed, and predicting that it in fact would be affirmed).
217
Dell, 177 A.3d at 23–24 (The Court of Chancery’s three points were “untenable in view of the Court
of Chancery’s own findings of fact as considered in light of established principles of corporate finance.”).
218
Id. at 27.
219
Id. at 24.
220
Id. at 26 (“There is also no evidence in the record that investors were ‘myopic’ or short-sighted. Rather,
the record shows analysts understood Dell’s long-term plans. But they just weren’t buying Mr. Dell’s story
. . . .”).
221
Id. at 28 (“[W]e see ‘no rational connection’ between a buyer’s status as a financial sponsor and the
question of whether the deal price is a fair price.”).
214
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matter.222 The sales process, not the identity of the bidders, determines the
reliability of the sales price.223
The third factor that undermined the Court of Chancery’s confidence in the
deal price was the lack of competitive pressure put on the management group’s
bid.224 The Supreme Court was more comfortable with the level of
competition.225 The members of the special committee were independent,
experienced, and empowered to say no.226 The financial advisers to the special
committee did their best to generate bidders.227 The Supreme Court chalked up
any lack of competition to doubts about the company’s future.228 Indeed, the
Supreme Court assumed that leaks about the transaction alone generated
sufficient market pressure.229 In this sense, the Supreme Court seemed to suggest
that in such a context the actual process followed by the target board is almost
irrelevant, as any interested bidders will appear by their own initiative.230
Including additional bidders in the process up front, on this reasoning, would
have changed nothing.231
In analyzing the post-signing developments, the Court of Chancery focused
on the complexity of the transaction for any potential bidder and on the
complicated relationship between Michael Dell, his buyout group, and the
company’s future.232 The Supreme Court viewed the informational asymmetry
222
Id. (“[A]ll disciplined buyers, both strategic and financial, have internal rates of return that they expect
in exchange for taking on the large risk of a merger, or for that matter, any sizeable investment of capital.”)
(quoting DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 375 (Del. 2017)).
223
See id. at 34 (“Competition limited to private equity bidders does not foreclose the sale price reflecting
fair value, especially where the special committee instituted and oversaw a robust post-signing go-shop
process.”).
224
Id. at 16.
225
Id. at 29.
226
Id. at 28.
227
Id. at 28–29. In this Article, we focus on the Delaware Supreme Court’s errors of finance, but others
have argued that the Court’s fact-finding, particularly on this point, relies on mischaracterizations of the trial
record. See Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 14–18).
228
Dell, 177 A.3d at 28 (noting that the special committee’s financial advisers “choreographed the sale
process to involve competition with Silver Lake at every stage, both pre-signing and during the go-shop. When
KKR walked, TPG, another major-league PE buyer, was introduced. And both KKR and TPG demurred for
many of the objective reasons that the stock market—and, later, Blackstone—doubted Dell’s ability to transform
itself and become more profitable.”).
229
Id. (“[G]iven leaks that Dell was exploring strategic alternatives, record testimony suggests that
Evercore presumed that any interested parties would have approached the Company before the go-shop if serious
about pursuing a deal.”).
230
Id. at 29 (The trial court’s “assessment that more bidders—both strategic and financial—should have
been involved assumes there was some party interested in proceeding.”).
231
Id. at 28 (“Nothing in the record suggests that increased competition would have produced a better
result.”).
232
Id. at 32.
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problem as one that was only “theoretical,” as no one could point to a bidder
who declined to participate.233 Michael Dell, moreover, was not a conventional
controlling stockholder. He was CEO, to be sure, but he had pledged to vote his
stock proportionally with other stockholders in the event of a higher bid.234 Any
risks associated with a management buyout, in the Supreme Court’s view, were
also “theoretical,” and none undermined the deal price as a marker of fair
value.235
At the end of the day, the Supreme Court simply saw nothing wrong with
the sales process. A set of basic attributes of the transaction—”evidence of
market efficiency, fair play, low barriers to entry, outreach to all logical buyers,
and the chance for any topping bidder to have the support of Mr. Dell’s own
votes”—left the Court of Chancery with only one possible conclusion: that the
deal price should receive “heavy weight” in determining the fair value of the
company.236
In some ways, the Supreme Court opinion recapitulated many of the same
themes that arose during proceedings four years earlier, when class action
plaintiffs challenging the Dell transaction sought to expedite proceedings. ThenChancellor Strine issued a ruling from the bench denying the motion and
expressing puzzlement at the allegations of wrongdoing in the deal.237 He
emphasized precisely the same issues that appeared in the Supreme Court
opinion: the pre-signing competition among private equity buyers, the modest
deal protections, and the post-signing go-shop activity.238 As a result, he

233
Id. (“[A]side from the theoretical, the Court of Chancery did not point to any bidder who actually shied
away from exploring an acquisition out of fear of the winner’s curse phenomenon.”). Subramanian characterizes
this as “a remarkable test” that would be virtually impossible to meet. See Subramanian, supra note 11
(manuscript at 19) (“In ten years of studying go-shops and twenty years of studying deal jumping situations, I
have never seen this kind of evidence. But it defies common sense and well-accepted economic theory to claim
that the absence of such evidence means that a winner’s curse concern does not exist.”).
234
Dell, 177 A.3d at 30.
235
Id. at 31 (“[N]one of these theoretical characteristics detracts from the reliability of the deal price on
the facts presented here.”); id. at 34 (“[T]he [trial] court did not identify any possible bidders that were actually
deterred because of Mr. Dell’s status.”). As with their holding on information asymmetries, Subramanian notes
that this “sets an evidentiary bar that would be virtually impossible to meet.” Subramanian, supra note 11
(manuscript at 23).
236
Dell, 177 A.3d at 35 (“[F]ailure to give the resulting price heavy weight because the trial judge believes
there was mispricing missed by all the Dell stockholders, analysts, and potential buyers abuses even the wide
discretion afforded the Court of Chancery in these difficult cases.”).
237
Transcript of Motion for Expedited Hearings at 34–35, In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., No. 9322-VCL,
2016 WL 3186538 (Del. May 31, 2016) (No. 8329-CS).
238
Id. at 13 (“There was not only presigning competition among private equity sponsors, there was an
active postsigning go-shop with insubstantial deal protections.”).
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concluded that there was no “conceivable basis” on which the board might have
fallen short of its Revlon obligations.239
II. CORPORATE FINANCE IN DFC GLOBAL AND DELL
In the abstract, the outcomes of Dell and DFC Global—deference to the deal
price in both cases—are not particularly alarming. Had the trial courts reached
the same conclusions, many would not have batted an eyelash. The fact that the
Supreme Court overruled the considered opinions of the Court of Chancery in
the manner it did, however, is troubling. The Supreme Court repeatedly found
that the trial courts had abused their discretion, sometimes on the ground that
their holdings found no support in the record, but primarily on the ground that
the Court of Chancery’s conclusions violated basic precepts of financial
economics.240 Indeed, throughout both the Dell and DFC Global opinions, the
Supreme Court professed to be guided by principles of financial economics.
They emphasized their fidelity to “relevant, accepted financial principles”241 and
“established principles of corporate finance”242 and “reliable principles of
corporate finance and economics.”243 But on closer examination, it is the
Supreme Court’s opinions, not those of the Court of Chancery, that misapply
and misunderstand basic financial economics. This Part explores the financial
concepts at play in the two opinions.
A. Firm-Specific Risks and the LBO Pricing Model
Looming over both cases was the role of the private equity or leveraged
buyout (LBO) valuation models.244 Both opinions in the Court of Chancery
relied in part on fact that the buyers were private equity firms in declining to

239
Id. at 42 (“I do not see any plausible, conceivable basis in which to conclude that it is a colorable
possibility that you could deem the choices made by this board to be unreasonable with all the different
safeguards.”). See generally Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986)
(setting forth a target board’s obligations in the context of the sale of the company).
240
See, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d at 5.
241
Id. at 44.
242
Id. at 24.
243
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 372 (Del. 2017).
244
In its purest form, an LBO valuation seeks to determine how much money could be borrowed and used
to buy a company while still having the debt serviced by the cash flows of the target. More generally, an LBO
valuation seeks to determine how much an acquirer could pay for a company while still achieving a target return.
See JOSHUA ROSENBAUM & JOSHUA PEARL, INVESTMENT BANKING: VALUATION, LEVERAGED BUYOUTS, AND
MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 195–96 (2009) (“[An LBO model] is used . . . to determine an implied valuation
range for a given target in a potential LBO sale based on achieving acceptable returns.”).
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give deference to the merger price.245 Some market participants felt as though
the opinions had placed a target on the backs of private equity firms,246 and the
issue figured prominently in the appeals.247 The Dell trial court decision
examined this issue in far greater depth, but it was the first of the Supreme
Court’s two opinions, DFC Global, that devoted the most attention to the issue
and made the foundational analytical errors.248
The Court of Chancery in Dell noted that private equity firms generally rely
on similar methods to price their deals and also have comparatively high costs
of capital.249 As a consequence, their models will generate valuations lower than
what a DCF analysis would generate for a firm owned by diversified public
investors.250 If a target corporation limits the pool of bidders to private equity
firms, the process will naturally generate bids constrained by their shared IRR
targets.251 Vice Chancellor Laster pointed out that the special committee’s
financial advisers highlighted these very dynamics and expressed concern that a
sale process limited to financial sponsors would not achieve fair value.252
Relatedly, in explaining his misgivings about the sales process in DFC
Global, Chancellor Bouchard articulated a worry that the board agreed to sell
the company while in “turbulent regulatory waters that imposed considerable
uncertainty on the company’s future profitability, and even its viability.”253 He
noted that this regulatory uncertainty impacted both the valuation that the market
placed on the common stock of DFC Global and also the value that a private
equity buyer, seeking to meet a high IRR, would place on the company.254 The
Chancellor was right to acknowledge the substantial regulatory risk facing the
company and to appreciate the financial implications of it for a deal with a
private equity buyer.

245
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *22–23 (Del. Ch. July 8,
2016); In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *36–37 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
246
Hals, supra note 212 (“Wall Street dealmakers have warned that Bouchard’s view made it difficult for
private equity buyers to protect their deals from appraisal-seeking hedge funds.”).
247
Dell, 177 A.3d at 1; DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 346.
248
Dell, 177 A.3d at 1; DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 346.
249
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *30.
250
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., 2016 WL 3753123, at *30–32.
251
In re Appraisal of Dell, Inc., 2016 WL 3186538, at *30 (noting that “the outcome of competition
between financial sponsors primarily depends on their relative willingness to sacrifice potential IRR. It does not
lead to intrinsic value”).
252
Id. (“JPMorgan told the Committee in December 2012 that ‘given comparable LP make-up and return
hurdles,’ it was ‘unlikely to see any material difference’ between Silver Lake’s offer and what other financial
sponsors would pay.”).
253
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., 2016 WL 3753123, at *21.
254
Id. at *22–23.
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A bedrock feature of modern portfolio theory is the distinction between firmspecific risk and systematic or market risk.255 Firm-specific risk is “risk that
potentially can be eliminated by diversification,” while market risk is “risk that
you can’t avoid, regardless of how much you diversify.”256 A central tenet of
modern portfolio theory is that the expected return, and therefore the price, of
the publicly traded securities of a firm depends not on the total risk facing a firm
but instead on only its systematic risk—the firm’s exposure to the risk of the
market as a whole.257 Firm-specific or unsystematic risk of the sort facing
particular firms can be cheaply and easily diversified away by public investors.
They demand no compensation (in the form of a higher return) for bearing firmspecific risk,258 and thus firm-specific risk is not relevant to the price of a
publicly traded stock.259
The only type of risk that affects stock prices is market risk, typically
represented by the stock’s “beta,” a measure of the stock’s sensitivity to
movements in the market as a whole.260 As one widely used textbook
summarizes the point, “[n]o matter how much total risk an asset has, only the
systematic portion is relevant in determining the expected return (and the risk
premium) on that asset.”261 As a result, the equity of firms with a significant
degree of firm-specific risk is often more valuable when held primarily by
diversified public investors than when held by a small number of concentrated,
undiversified owners. In this context, the Supreme Court’s new formulation of
statutory “fair value” as whatever stockholders would receive in a fair deal may
diverge dramatically from the traditional concept of awarding dissenters the
value of what has been taken from them.

255

See, e.g., Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J. FIN. 77, 77 (1952).
See RICHARD A. BREALEY ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE 170 (10th ed. 2011).
257
Id. at 170 (“For a reasonably well-diversified portfolio, only market risk matters.”); STEPHEN A. ROSS
ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF CORPORATE FINANCE 418 (8th ed. 2008) (“The expected return on an asset depends
only on that asset’s systematic risk.”).
258
See BREALEY ET AL., supra note 256.
259
ROSS ET AL., supra note 257, at 418 (“The systematic risk principle states that the reward for bearing
risk depends only on the systematic risk of an investment. The underlying rationale for this principle is
straightforward: Because unsystematic risk can be eliminated at virtually no cost (by diversifying), there is no
reward for bearing it. Put another way, the market does not reward risks that are borne unnecessarily.”).
260
See, e.g., BREALEY ET AL., supra note 256, at 175 (“The beta of an individual security measures its
sensitivity to market movements . . . . In a portfolio context, a security’s risk is measured by beta.”).
261
ROSS ET AL., supra note 257, at 418; see Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat, supra note 13 (manuscript at
44) (discussing stockholders’ ability to reduce the risk of business decisions through a diversified portfolio).
256
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The considerable regulatory uncertainty faced by DFC Global was largely a
species of firm-specific risk.262 As a public company, however, that risk would
be of little consequence to public stockholders.263 Post-merger, however, the
equity of DFC Global was held as a concentrated position by a single financial
sponsor.264 A merger transaction with a private equity buyer meant the
abandonment of a capital structure perfectly suited to bearing that firm-specific
risk—public holdings by diversified investors—in favor of ownership by a
financial sponsor that could not fully diversify away the firm-specific risk and
would necessarily have to discount for it. The risk, in other words, would not
matter to public investors but mattered dramatically to private buyers.
This difference in the treatment of firm-specific risk can drive a wedge
between price paid by a private equity buyer and the value as a going concern.
This may be so even in a competitive process, if that competition is limited to
private equity buyers. Incidentally, this insight provides an answer to the
puzzlement some commentators expressed after Dell: how can the fair value of
a company be more than any bidder is willing to pay?265 The possibility this
“puzzle” ignores is that the company is worth more if it is not bought by anybody
and instead remains public, held by diversified investors. Given the Delaware
courts’ task of valuing the company “as a going concern,” this is a strange
possibility to overlook.266
Significantly, a private equity buyer is not the only relevant actor who must
discount for firm-specific risk. The directors and officers of DFC Global
themselves held large, undiversified investments in the company, both in
financial capital and in human capital.267 As a result, the managers bore
substantial firm-specific risk. They thus had a powerful incentive to offload the
firm’s regulatory risk through a sale of the company, even at a discount to its
value to diversified stockholders as a going concern. Notably, the chairman and
CEO was approaching retirement age and owned nearly 3.4% of the company
262

See In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *18 (Del. Ch. July 8,

2016).
263

DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 348 (Del. 2017).
Id. at 348.
265
See, e.g., Sorkin, supra note 164.
266
If, of course, as is usually the case, the pre-announcement market price is less than the negotiated
merger price, the apparent mystery returns. As is discussed more in the next section, however, the mystery again
dissipates if one acknowledges that (1) prices of individual shares traded on public markets do not reflect the
value of control—the so-called “control premium”—which dissenters are entitled to share; (2) prices of
individual stocks can depart substantially from fundamental value; and/or (3) fair value of the target firm may
change between when the merger is announced and when it is completed, at which time fair value is determined.
See infra Section II.B.
267
DFC Glob. Corp., Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 82 (Oct. 7, 2013).
264
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in stock and options.268 Had the company failed, the result would have been a
calamity for the CEO—but not for diversified public stockholders.
The court’s skepticism of the transaction may well have been prompted by
this conflict of interest between management and outside stockholders. Indeed,
though Chancellor Bouchard did not write in terms of firm-specific and market
risk, he appeared to recognize the issue, repeatedly pointing to DFC Global’s
unusual degree of regulatory risk as a reason to doubt the meaningfulness of the
merger price.269
Delaware case law has in the past recognized the problems arising from
precisely this sort of conflict. Then-Vice Chancellor Strine, for example,
observed in In re Lear that an executive’s exposure to non-diversifiable risk
could generate a conflict.270 The retirement-age executive’s concentrated equity
position in a risky firm could “create incentives that actually give managers
reasons to pursue ends not shared by the corporation’s public stockholders.”271
The court noted that the CEO “had powerful interests to agree to a price and
terms suboptimal for public investors” because doing so would allow the CEO
to cash out his equity stake.272 The role of this conflict in the transaction received
no attention in the DFC Global appeal or in the Delaware Supreme Court’s
decision in the case.273
Shortly before the Supreme Court’s DFC Global opinion, Vice Chancellor
Slights tried to grapple in a different way with this private equity issue in the
PetSmart appraisal.274 The court there was unpersuaded by the argument that a
private equity buyer’s higher target rate of return would lead to a deal price
below fair value.275 The court emphasized that the high return targets of financial

268

Id. at 7, 14.
See, e.g., In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *4 (Del. Ch. July
8, 2016) (“Part of Lone Star’s interest in the transaction related to the regulatory uncertainty. Lone Star sought
to take advantage of this uncertainty by buying DFC at this time, when its performance was weak and outlook
unclear.”); id. at *18.
270
See In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 926 A.2d 94, 117 (Del. Ch. 2007) (discussing CEO’s nondiversifiable risk and its effect on the merger selling point).
271
See id. at 116.
272
Id. at 117.
273
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P.,172 A.3d 346 (Del. 2017).
274
See In re Appraisal of PetSmart, Inc., No. 10782-VCS, 2017 WL 2303599, at *29 (Del. Ch., May 26,
2017).
275
Id. (“And while it is true that private equity firms construct their bids with desired returns in mind, it
does not follow that a private equity firm’s final offer at the end of a robust and competitive auction cannot
ultimately be the best indicator of fair value for the company.”).
269
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sponsors would be offset by greater risks post-transaction arising from the use
of leverage.276
This is partly true, but beside the point. A private equity sponsor will insist
on a higher IRR than diversified public investors, precisely to offset its exposure
to leverage and firm-specific risk.277 The question that matters is not whether the
financial sponsor is getting a free lunch. Instead, the question is whether the deal
price reflects the value of the target firm as a going concern. Firms will
frequently have a lower cost of capital—and, as a consequence, a higher value—
when they have an equity base of diversified public stockholders, rather than a
single owner who may be undiversified and highly leveraged.
While the Court of Chancery in PetSmart failed to appreciate the
significance of the LBO model argument, the Supreme Court, in both DFC
Global and Dell, appeared to misunderstand it completely.278 Instead of
contending with it in any meaningful way, the court instead grappled with a
series of weak arguments that nobody before it was making. At one point, the
court seemed determined to refute the argument that having a target rate of return
is nefarious—a suggestion no one had made.279 The court hammers away for
dozens of pages at a strawman: that buyers could not value risks.280 In DFC
Global, the Supreme Court emphasized that “[t]he buyers who were part of the
sales process—and who ultimately decided not to pursue a transaction with
DFC—considered regulatory risk.”281 Elsewhere, the court emphasized the fact
that it was natural for potential buyers to worry about regulatory risk.282 The
Supreme Court faulted the Court of Chancery in DFC Global for citing “no
276
See id. at *29 n.352 (“The LBO model, however, is risk adjusted to account for post-transaction
leverage. It follows, then, that the higher rate of return sought by bidders employing an LBO model will be offset
by the fact that most of the purchase price is financed with debt . . . .”).
277
See supra notes 249–52.
278
At one point in its DFC Global opinion, the court admits that, “[t]o be candid, we do not understand
the logic of [the] finding” that a deal price built around a private buyer’s IRR and financing constraints is not
strong evidence of value as a going concern; the ensuing analysis bears out this admission. DFC Glob., 172 A.3d
at 349. In Dell, the court reiterated that there is “‘no rational connection’ between a buyer’s status as a financial
sponsor and the question of whether the deal price is a fair price.” Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven
Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 28 (Del. 2017) (citing DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 349–50).
279
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 375 (“[A]ll disciplined buyers, both strategic and financial, have internal rates
of return that they expect in exchange for taking the large risk of a merger, or for that matter, any sizeable
investment of its capital.”).
280
See id. at 346.
281
Id. at 373 (“[T]he record reveals that equity analysts, equity buyers, debt analysts, debt providers and
others were in fact attuned to the regulatory risks facing DFC.”).
282
Id. at 349 (“The Court of Chancery did not cite, and we are unaware of, any academic or empirical
basis to conclude that market players like the many who were focused on this company’s value would not have
examined the potential for regulatory action and factored it into their assessments of the company’s value.”).
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economic literature to suggest that markets themselves cannot price this sort of
regulatory risk.”283
All of this is orthogonal to the point. Of course private buyers would pay
attention to firm-specific risk, and of course they might be expert at
incorporating that risk into their valuation models.284 The critical point is that
private equity buyers had to discount the company’s future value for this risk,
when diversified public shareholders did not.285
The Supreme Court’s failure to confront the distinction between firmspecific and market risk—and its implications for valuation—is evident
elsewhere in DFC Global. The court at one point, for example, asserts that
“[e]quity betas increase with the risk of the business.”286 In fact, equity betas
increase with the market risk of the business, and have nothing to do with the
overall risk of the business.287
This mistake in analyzing the relevant financial principles drives a deeper
legal misunderstanding of “fair value.” In the two Supreme Court opinions,
confusion reigns over the statutory conception of “fair value.” The Dell opinion
oddly suggests the objective of the remedy is “fair treatment of the minority,”288
and in another place suggests the touchstone is whether dissenters “got fair value
and were not exploited” in receiving the deal price, a rather circular definition
that appears to overlap with fiduciary duty concerns.289 In DFC Global, the
Supreme Court more concretely gestures towards “fair value” equivalent to what
it would be in a fiduciary duty case—willing buyer, willing seller, etc.: “what
they deserve to receive based on what would fairly be given to them in an arm’slength transaction.”290 In articulating this novel understanding of appraisal—
which as noted above would create an equivalence between the deal price in an
arm’s-length transaction and fair value—the DFC Global opinion quoted and
drew support from language in Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., where
283

Id. at 372.
Id. at 373 (noting that “DFC’s regulatory risk was being watched by . . . potential buyers in the sale,”
a group “who had money at stake”).
285
The Supreme Court’s repeated references to DFC’s inability to refinance its debt suffers from a similar
problem, in that it never considers the possibility of offering a higher interest rate, and never mentions the
potentially higher interest rates confronting the buyer. Id. at 374.
286
Id. at 385 (citing SHANNON P. PRATT & ROGER J. GRABOWSKI, COST OF CAPITAL 203 (5th ed. 2014)).
287
Indeed, it is possible for a firm to have extremely high levels of risk and still have a low beta, if that
risk is primarily firm-specific—that is, not closely correlated to overall market movements. See BREALEY ET
AL., supra note 256, at 185–203.
288
See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. 2017).
289
Id. at 33.
290
See DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 370–71.
284
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Chancellor Allen considered the fair price prong of the entire fairness
analysis.291 While this standard makes sense in the context of a fiduciary duty
action, where the issue is the personal liability of directors for their actions in
negotiating a deal, it is out of place in appraisal. The reason this is wrong in
appraisal—and the reason that “value as a going concern” is right—is that this
standard ignores the obvious possibility that the company might be more
valuable when held by public, diversified shareholders.292
B. Abuse of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
Perhaps the most remarked-upon aspect of the Dell and DFC Global
opinions is their enthusiastic embrace of the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis
(ECMH). If this embrace is not merely situational, it could portend a tectonic
shift in Delaware jurisprudence well beyond the appraisal context.293 The DFC
Global opinion, in particular, includes a paean to the magic of market pricing
that would make Hayek blush, emphasizing that “the market price should distill
the collective judgment of the many . . . .”294 Both opinions claim that the stock
for each company traded in an efficient market,295 and in Dell, the Supreme
Court chided the trial court for “ignor[ing] the efficient market hypothesis long
endorsed by this Court”296 and for doubting the reliability of a “price produced
by an efficient market.”297
As a matter of doctrine, the notion that the Delaware courts have “long
endorsed” the ECMH strains credibility.298 More importantly, the Delaware
291

Cinerama, Inc. v. Technicolor, Inc., 663 A.2d 1134, 1143 (Del. Ch. 1994), aff’d, 663 A.2d 1156 (Del.

1995).
292
As noted above, supra note 266, this can be true even where the deal price is higher than the preannouncement market price.
293
See infra Section III.B.
294
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 369.
295
Id. at 373 (“[T]he company had . . . a deep base of public shareholders, and highly active trading, the
price . . . reflects the judgments of many stockholders about the company’s future prospects, based on public
filings, industry information, and research conducted by equity analysts.”); Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event
Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. 2017) (“[T]he evidence suggests that the market for Dell’s shares
was actually efficient and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value.”). These factual findings, of course,
were not supported by the kinds of expert testimony as to market efficiency that are de rigeur in securities fraud
class actions. Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 922139,
at *24 n.257 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018) (noting the possibility that “future appraisal litigants will retain experts on
market efficiency, as is common in federal securities actions . . . .”).
296
Dell, 177 A.3d at 24.
297
Id. at 24, 25 n.113 (citing DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 373).
298
Even restricting oneself to seminal casebook cases, one finds example after example of Delaware courts
rejecting market prices as definitive, even for large companies with highly liquid trading markets. See, e.g.,
Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1384 (Del. 1995) (allowing directors to take defensive measures
due to “the risk that shareholders will mistakenly accept an underpriced offer because they disbelieve
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Supreme Court paints a misleading picture of the modern understanding of the
ECMH, deploying it for purposes to which it is not suited. In particular, the court
repeatedly relies on the ECMH in its effort to wave away all evidence that a
stock price does not reflect fair value.299 To be sure, the court frequently softens
the claim that market prices are the best evidence of fair value through modifiers
like “likely” and “generally.”300 In every concrete circumstance, however, the
Supreme Court held that the trial court judges had abused their discretion by
crediting evidence that the market price was incorrect—evidence like the
repeated and detailed arguments by Michael Dell that the market was

management’s representations of intrinsic value”); id. at 1385 (finding it reasonable to fear that “Unitrin’s
shareholders might accept American General’s inadequate Offer because of ‘ignorance or mistaken belief’
regarding the Board’s assessment of the long-term value of Unitrin’s stock.”); Air Prods. & Chems., Inc. v.
Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 108–13 (Del. Ch. 2011) (same); Rapid-Am. Corp. v. Harris, 603 A.2d 796, 806 (Del.
1992) (noting that “Munds’ succinct evaluation of the market has lost none of its lustre”); In re Time, Inc.
S’holder Litig., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 n.12 (Del. 1990) (finding that “it is not a breach of faith for directors to
determine that the present stock market price of shares is not representative of true value”); Cede & Co. v.
Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 1182, 1187 n.8 (Del. 1988) (noting that “[i]nformation and insight not
communicated to the market may not be reflected in stock prices” and recognizing that insiders “may have
insight into their company’s future based primarily on bits and pieces of nonmaterial information that have value
as a totality”); Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875–76 (Del. 1985) (“Using market price as a basis for
concluding that the [merger price] adequately reflected the true value of the Company was a clearly faulty,
indeed fallacious, premise, as the defendants’ own evidence demonstrates.”); Paramount Commc’ns Inc. v. Time
Inc., Nos. 10866, 10670, 10935, 1989 WL 79880 (Del. Ch. 1989), at *19 (“[J]ust as the Constitution does not
enshrine Mr. Herbert Spencer’s social statics, neither does the common law of directors’ duties elevate the theory
of a single, efficient capital market to the dignity of a sacred text.”); Chi. Corp. v. Munds, 172 A. 452, 455 (Del.
Ch. 1934) (“When it is said that the appraisal which the market puts upon the value of the stock of an active
corporation as evidenced by its daily quotations, is an accurate, fair reflection of its intrinsic value, no more than
a moment’s reflection is needed to refute it.”). Perhaps the reason the Delaware Supreme Court’s claim to have
“long endorsed” the ECMH has attracted so much attention is that it rings false to anyone familiar with Delaware
case law.
299
See, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d at 6 (“[T]he evidence suggests that the market for Dell’s shares was actually
efficient and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value.”); id. at 24 (holding that the Court of Chancery’s
finding of a “valuation gap . . . ignored the efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by this court.”); id. (“[T]he
price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a
single analyst . . . .”); id. at 34 (“The apparent efficiency of Dell’s pre-signing stock market and the long-term
approach of its analysts undermine concerns of a ‘valuation gap.’”); id. at 35 (“[T]he market-based indicators of
value—both Dell’s stock price and deal price—have substantial probative value.”); DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 370
(“[I]n an efficient market you can trust prices, for they impound all available information about the value of each
security.”); id. at 368–69 (“In economics, the value of something is what it will fetch in the market. That is true
of corporations, just as it is true of gold.”); id. at 370 (“[C]orporate finance theory reflects a belief that if an
asset—such as the value of a company as reflected in the trading value of its stock—can be subject to close
examination and bidding by many humans with an incentive to estimate its future cash flows value, the resulting
collective judgment as to value is likely to be highly informative and that, all estimators having equal access to
information, the likelihood of outguessing the market over time and building a portfolio of stocks beating it is
slight.”); id. at 373 (“[T]he price at which its shares trade is informative of fair value . . . .”).
300
See, e.g., supra note 295.
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undervaluing Dell stock.301 So insistent was the Supreme Court on this point that
Vice Chancellor Laster—who was overruled in the Dell case—felt compelled in
a subsequent case to defer to the pre-announcement trading price, despite his
concerns about a defective deal process.302
In doing so, the Supreme Court has boldly gone where few economists have
gone in thirty-five years—conflating well-supported notions of semi-strong
market efficiency, often known as informational efficiency, with an unfounded
and widely discredited notion of value efficiency.303 Informational efficiency
simply implies that “available information” will—through the actions of market
participants—quickly become impounded in market prices, such that it is no
longer possible to make a profit by knowing the information.304 The evidence is
overwhelming that, at least for many types of information, modern stock markets
are usually highly informationally efficient.305 The notion of informational
efficiency is to be distinguished, however, from the notion of fundamental value
efficiency—the idea that the market price is, in some sense, “right.”306
Fundamental value efficiency remains unproven and, at root, likely unprovable,
in that any test of whether the market is “right” as to a company’s fundamental
value would have to presume some other way of measuring the company’s
fundamental value in the first place—a difficulty known in the finance literature
as the “joint hypothesis problem.”307
301
See, e.g., Dell, 177 A.3d at 27 (“In short, the record does not adequately support the Court of
Chancery’s conclusion that the market for Dell’s stock was inefficient and that a valuation gap in the Company’s
market trading price existed . . . .”); id. at 25 (“The record before us provides no rational, factual basis for such
a ‘valuation gap.’”); Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL
922139, at *1, *30 (Del. Ch. 2018) (“On appeal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that, in light of the attributes
of the market for Dell’s shares and the implications of the [ECMH], my reliance on the views of these
knowledgeable insiders constituted an abuse of discretion.”); id. at *31 (summarizing the evidence on a valuation
gap and concluding that “the Delaware Supreme Court regarded it as the equivalent of no evidence at all.”).
302
See Verition Partners, 2018 WL 922139, at *4, *39–41 (“Fortunately for a trial judge, once Delaware
law has embraced a traditional formulation of the efficient capital markets hypothesis, the unaffected market
price provides a direct route to the same endpoint, at least for a company that is widely traded and lacks a
controlling stockholder.”).
303
See, e.g., Lynn A. Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Market Failure, and
Securities Regulation, 81 VA. L. REV. 611, 646–47 (1995) [hereinafter Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly
Casinos?] (distinguishing informational from fundamental value efficiency); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms
of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to the New Finance, 28 J. CORP. L. 635, 639–41 (2003) [hereinafter
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency] (same).
304
See, e.g., Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient
Markets, 70 AM. ECON. REV. 393, 393–95 (1980) (defining a market as “informationally efficient” when “prices
are such that all arbitrage profits are eliminated”).
305
Stout, Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos?, supra note 303, at 646.
306
Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, supra note 303, at 639–41.
307
See Eugene F. Fama, Professor, Booth Sch., Univ. of Chi., Prize Lecture: Two Pillars of Asset Pricing
(Dec. 8, 2013), in THE NOBEL PRIZE, https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/2013/fama/lecture/
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While it is sometimes naively assumed that informational efficiency implies
valuation efficiency, in fact this is only true when informational efficiency is
combined with the consciously unrealistic assumptions underlying the Capital
Asset Pricing Model (CAPM).308 In particular, the traditional version of CAPM
expressly employs the simplifying assumption that all investors have the exact
same expectations as to future risks and returns.309 In a world where all investors
share a single opinion, the notion that market values will represent the “best”
estimate is simply a tautology.310 In reality, of course, investors have
heterogeneous expectations for the future. Even the godfather of the traditional
ECMH himself, Eugene Fama, has written that when the assumption of investor
homogeneity is relaxed “distortions of expected returns can be large” and that
“[o]ffsetting actions by informed investors [will] not typically suffice to cause
the price effects of erroneous beliefs to disappear with the passage of time.”311
As a result of this and other considerations, many leading economists have quite
modest expectations for value efficiency. For example, Fischer Black defined
“an efficient market as one in which price is within a factor of 2 of value, i.e.,
the price is more than half of value and less than twice value.”312

(last visited Nov. 12, 2018) (“Tests of [value] efficiency basically test whether the properties of expected returns
implied by the assumed model of market equilibrium are observed in actual returns. If the tests reject, we don’t
know whether the problem is an inefficient market or a bad model of market equilibrium.”); see also Eugene F.
Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. FIN. 383, 384, 413–14 (1970);
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets, in FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE: PORTFOLIO DECISIONS AND
SECURITIES PRICES 137 (1976).
308
See Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, supra note 303, at 641 (“When the CAPM is
combined with the ECMH, the two theories produce a joint prediction that, in an informationally efficient
market, prices will also be fundamental value efficient.”).
309
See John Lintner, The Valuation of Risk Assets and the Selection of Risky Investments in Stock
Portfolios and Capital Budgets, 47 REV. ECON. & STAT. 13, 14 (1965); William F. Sharpe, Capital Asset Prices:
A Theory of Market Equilibrium Under Conditions of Risk, 19 J. FIN. 425, 427 (1964); see also Stout, The
Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, supra note 303, at 641–42 (“One of the most remarkable (yet remarkably
unremarked-upon) characteristics of the classic CAPM is that the pioneering theorists who developed it began
by expressly assuming that all investors share homogenous expectations regarding the likely future returns and
risks associated with particular securities. In other words, they assumed that all investors agree.”).
310
See Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, supra note 303, at 641–42 (“Combining the ECMH
with the CAPM produces a prediction of fundamental value efficiency through a difference and more troubling
analytical path—by tautology. . . . If investors make identical estimates of securities’ future risks and returns, it
is inevitable that the market should mirror this ‘best’ estimate, because there is only one estimate—the estimate
of the homogenous investor.”).
311
Eugene F. Fama & Kenneth R. French, Disagreement, Tastes, and Asset Prices, 83 J. FIN. ECON. 667,
683 (2007). The creators of the first CAPM models have published similar conclusions. See WILLIAM F. SHARPE,
Disagreement, in PORTFOLIO THEORY AND CAPITAL MARKETS 104, 104–13 (1970); John Lintner, The
Aggregation of Investor’s Diverse Judgments and Preferences in Purely Competitive Security Markets, 4 J. FIN.
& QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 347, 347 (1969); Jack Treynor, Bulls, Bears, and Market Bubbles, 54 FIN.
ANALYSTS J. 69, 74 (1998).
312
Fischer Black, Noise, 41 J. FIN. 529, 533 (1986).
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While the joint hypothesis problem renders rigorous conclusions elusive,
examples of apparent violations of value efficiency—and even informational
efficiency—have multiplied over the decades.313 These examples range from
market-wide bubbles, to slow market reactions to difficult-to-understand
information,314 to apparently irrational reactions to content-free events, such as
companies having their stock prices jump after adding “.com” to their names in
the late 1990s, without any change to the underlying business.315 Personally, the
authors have two favorite recent examples. In December of 2017, Long Island
Iced Tea Corp.—a maker of, naturally, iced tea—announced that it was changing
its name to “Long Blockchain Corp.” and exploring opportunities related to
Bitcoin.316 Despite the implausibility of an iced tea company having any
competitive advantage in cryptocurrencies, the company’s stock price as much
as tripled overnight, before eventually falling back.317
Our other favorite example is one given in an interview by 2017 Nobel Prize
winning economist Richard Thaler.318 The Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund is a
closed-end mutual fund whose assets are entirely made up of other publicly
traded securities.319 An investor could therefore replicate the assets of the fund
by simply buying the underlying securities directly. As Thaler tells it, “[f]or
many years, [the fund] traded at a discount of about 10–15 percent of net asset
value, meaning that you could buy $100 worth of its assets for $85-90.”320 By
itself, this so-called “closed-end mutual fund” discount is something of a

313
The trial court in Dell provided a useful canvass of the literature on market anomalies and behavioral
economics. See In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *24 n.16 (Del. Ch. May 31,
2016); see also Verition Partners Master Fund Ltd. v. Aruba Networks, Inc., No. 11448-VCL, 2018 WL 922139,
at *24 n.257 (Del. Ch. Feb. 15, 2018).
314
See Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency, supra note 303, at 639–41.
315
Joe Pinsker, The Once-Upon-a-Time Magic of Adding ‘.com’ to a Company’s Name, ATLANTIC
(Aug. 6, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2014/08/the-once-upon-a-time-magic-of-addingcom-to-a-companys-name/375658/.
316
See Olga Kharif, Long Blockchain May Have Misled Investors, Nasdaq Says in Letter, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 21, 2018, 6:34 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-02-21/long-blockchain-may-havemisled-investors-nasdaq-says-in-letter.
317
Id.; Paul R. La Monica, Iced Tea Company Kills Plans to Buy Bitcoin Mining Rigs, CNN MONEY
(Feb. 2, 2018, 11:22 AM), https://money.cnn.com/2018/02/02/investing/long-blockchain-long-island-iced-teabitcoin/index.html; Arie Shapira & Kailey Leinz, Long Island Iced Tea Soars After Changing Its Name to Long
Blockchain, BLOOMBERG (Dec. 21, 2017, 5:17 PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-1221/crypto-craze-sees-long-island-iced-tea-rename-as-long-blockchain.
318
Binyamin Appelbaum, Nobel in Economics is Awarded to Richard Thaler, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 9, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/09/business/nobel-economics-richard-thaler.html.
319
Company Overview of the Herzfeld Caribbean Basin Fund Inc., BLOOMBERG, https://www.bloomberg.
com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=6184169 (last visited Nov. 12, 2018).
320
Are Markets Efficient?, CHI. BOOTH REV. (June 30, 2016), http://review.chicagobooth.edu/
economics/2016/video/are-markets-efficient (interview with Eugene Fama and Richard Thaler).
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puzzle.321 This fund, however, traded under the ticker symbol “CUBA.”322 On
the day President Obama announced a thawing of relations with Cuba, the
country, the value of CUBA, the stock, skyrocketed even as the value of the
underlying securities held by CUBA remained flat.323 The same assets that the
market “valued” at $90 on one day cost $170 the following day.324
In the same interview, Eugene Fama dismisses such examples as
“anecdotes.”325 But he does not dismiss the CUBA example because he believes
that the fundamental value of CUBA, the company, actually skyrocketed when
President Obama relaxed tensions with Cuba, the country.326 He dismisses it as
an “anecdote” in the context of arguing that these examples do not furnish
generalizable predictions that would form the basis a new asset pricing model as
an alternative to CAPM and its progeny.327 As Fama himself notes, “[t]he point
is not that markets are efficient. They’re not. It’s just a model.”328
An appraisal action, however, is itself an anecdote. The task for a court in
considering the market price is not to forge a new general model of asset pricing,
but rather to evaluate how well the traditional model functions in the case—the
anecdote—before it.
In theory, the Delaware Supreme Court purports to recognize the limitations
on the value efficiency of markets, modestly noting only that it is “likely” or
“generally” the case that market prices will be a good proxy for fundamental
value.329 But the court then goes on to erect a virtually insurmountable
evidentiary burden for any trial court that would take these equivocations
seriously. The Supreme Court did not merely disagree with the Vice Chancellor

321

Id.
Id.
323
Id. (“Thaler: . . . Then, all of a sudden, one day it sells for a 70 percent premium. That was the day
President Obama announced his intention to relax relations with Cuba.”).
324
Id. (“Thaler: . . . So securities you could buy for $90 on one day cost you $170 the next day.”). Note
that this jump is not related to a jump in the value of the actual underlying assets, but in both cases are scaled to
that underlying value. That is, the day before President Obama’s announcement, you could buy $100 worth of
underlying securities by buying $90 worth of CUBA. The next day, it would cost you $170 to buy $100 worth
of underlying securities—securities, remember, that you could instead buy directly for $100. Id.
325
Id.
326
Id.
327
Id.
328
Id.
329
See, e.g., Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 6 (Del. 2017)
(“[T]he evidence suggests that the market for Dell’s shares was . . . likely a possible proxy for fair value.”
(emphasis added)); id. at 24 (“[T]he price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment
of fair value than the view of a single analyst . . . .” (emphasis added)); id. at 35 (“[T]he market-based indicators
of value—both Dell’s stock price and deal price—have substantial probative value.” (emphasis added)).
322
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in Dell about the possibility of a valuation gap; it concluded that he abused his
discretion in crediting the possibility.330
The distinction between information efficiency and value efficiency has
played an important role in Delaware law outside of the appraisal context.331 As
a Vice Chancellor, for example, Chief Justice Strine chided plaintiffs for asking
him to follow “blindly some crude rendition of the semi-strong form of the
efficient capital markets hypothesis, one in which any board should treat the
current market price as a reliable guidepost to decisionmaking. My
understanding of ECMH is that it makes much less drastic claims.”332 In Dell,
the Delaware Supreme Court found that the trial court abused its discretion by
not treating Dell’s market price as a reliable guidepost, despite overwhelming
evidence that Dell’s management did not regard it as a reliable guidepost,
either.333 The Dell decision thus signals either a deep shift in Delaware’s law or
a willingness to rely on the ECMH only in the context of appraisal proceedings.
Whatever its motivation, the Delaware Supreme Court’s conflation of
informational efficiency and value efficiency is unfortunate, but perhaps
understandable. Despite the foregoing discussion, there is indeed good reason to
believe that modern securities markets are generally efficient, and that the
judgment of the market is generally better than that of individual market
participants. Both opinions, however, then push beyond this uncontroversial
proposition, misusing it in two ways.
First, the Delaware Supreme Court implicitly assumes that the fundamental
value determined by the market can be treated as the equivalent of the
jurisprudential concept of fair value in an appraisal proceeding. The court
properly acknowledges that “fair value” under the appraisal statute is a
“jurisprudential, rather than purely economic, construct.”334 This is only natural,
of course, as the appraisal remedy involves a share of stock (a jurisprudential
330

Id. at 24.
Infra note 332 and accompanying text.
332
In re Dollar Thrifty S’holder Litig., 14 A.3d 573, 611 (Del. Ch. 2010) (Strine, V.C.); see also Leo E.
Strine, Jr., Who Bleeds When the Wolves Bite?: A Flesh-and-Blood Perspective on Hedge Fund Activism and
Our Strange Corporate Governance System, 126 YALE L.J. 1870, 1930 (2017) (“[T]he claim of the efficient
market hypothesis is not that a corporation’s stock price at any time is a reliable estimate of fundamental value,
but rather that it is not possible to design a trading strategy that will outguess the guesses of the market as a
whole.”).
333
Dell, 177 A.3d at 27.
334
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 367 (Del. 2017) (“[T]he definition
of fair value used in appraisal cases is a jurisprudential concept that has certain nuances that neither an economist
nor market participant would usually consider when either valuing a minority block of shares or a public
company as a whole.”).
331
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concept) in a corporation (another jurisprudential concept). And the transaction
triggering the appraisal remedy is a not actually a sale but instead that great
grandee of jurisprudential concepts, a statutory merger, which cancels stock by
operation of law. These jurisprudential concepts have been developed over the
centuries to aid in the efficient aggregation and deployment of capital, and they
come with various features and rights designed to further those ends. One
essential element in the concept of fair value in appraisal is the idea that the
valuation ignores the fractionalized equity interest in the company and awards
stockholders their proportional share of the company’s value as a going
concern.335 Doing so allows all stockholders to share in the gains from the sale
of control. This element assists in the aggregation and deployment of capital by
minimizing the discount capital-seeking entrepreneurs would otherwise have to
offer minority stockholders.336 When the Delaware Supreme Court analogizes
determining the value of a company in appraisal to determining the value of a
gold nugget—as it did in DFC Global—it makes a category error.337
The Supreme Court repeatedly imagined how “an economist” would view
matters at bar in DFC Global,338 but this recurring dramatic role only
emphasizes the court’s misunderstandings of how stock market efficiency bears
on the question in appraisal. The court at one point says:
Precisely because DFC’s shares were widely traded on a public market
based on upon a rich information base, the ‘fair value of the
stockholder’s shares of stock’ held by minority stockholders like the
petitioners, would, to an economist, likely be best reflected by the
prices at which their shares were trading as of the merger.339

This is wrong. The assets being valued are not alike: stock market values do not
reflect the value of corporate control. Moreover, the trading price of the shares
“as of the merger” will almost always be the deal price, not because of any
economic fact about the value of the company but only because, by operation of
law, the shares are about to be cancelled and cashed out for that price. That is

335
See, e.g., Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (“[T]he objective of a section
262 appraisal is ‘to value the corporation itself, as distinguished from a specific fraction of its shares as they
may exist in the hands of a particular shareholder.’”).
336
See id. at 1145 (“More important, to fail to accord a minority shareholder the full proportionate value
of [the petitioner’s] shares imposes a penalty for lack of control, and unfairly enriches the majority shareholders
who may reap a windfall from the appraisal process by cashing out a dissenting shareholder, a clearly undesirable
result.”).
337
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 368–69 (“In economics, the value of something is what it will fetch in the
market. That is true of corporations, just as it is true of gold.”).
338
Id. at 367, 369.
339
Id. at 367 (citation omitted).
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not economics. It tells us nothing about whether the price at which the shares
will be cashed out represents the fair value. Even absent an impending merger,
the trading price of shares will reflect, in part, the value of the judicial
protections offered to minority stockholders, rendering it impossible to identify
what the firm is “worth” independent of the value of those minority protections.
In defense of its holding that the trial court abused its discretion, the
Delaware Supreme Court in Dell resorts to the non sequitur that the fair value
selected by the Court of Chancery “did not reflect a value deemed attractive to
the buyers of Dell’s 1,765,369,276 publicly traded shares.”340 Even if the market
for individual shares were value efficient, however, the prevailing price would
be for minority positions. Under Delaware law, the remedy affords the dissenter
the “proportionate interest in [the] going concern”—a pro rata share of the
whole.341 That is the key distinction between valuing the entire company as a
going concern and merely valuing a share of stock—that is, the price at which a
willing buyer and willing seller will exchange a minority position in the
company. A market price, even if it is value efficient, can only ever set a floor
for the fair value of the entire company.
The second way the Delaware Supreme Court compounds its errors is via
the suggestion that the efficiency of trading in the market for individual shares
necessarily implies something entirely distinct: that the transaction price
constitutes fair value.342 In so doing, the Supreme Court effectively reads the
“Capital” out of the Efficient Capital Markets Hypothesis, ascribing to the deal
market characteristics of efficiency that have not been definitively demonstrated
even for deep capital markets.
It should perhaps go without saying, but the market for individual shares of
a company is not the same thing as the market for the whole company. The
efficiency of the trading in the market for a company’s stock does not imply
anything about the sales process or the efficiency of the deal market. Among the
necessary conditions for market efficiency are liquidity and fungibility.343
Securities market prices tend to be at least informationally efficient because they
340

Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 37 (Del. 2017).
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989) (quoting Tri-Cont’l Corp. v. Battye,
74 A.2d 71, 72 (Del. 1950)). The court’s job is “to value the corporation itself, as distinguished from a specific
fraction of its shares as they may exist in the hands of a particular shareholder.” Id.
342
Dell, 177 A.3d at 6 (“[T]he evidence suggests that the market for Dell’s shares was actually efficient
and, therefore, likely a possible proxy for fair value.”); id. at 35 (“[T]he market based indicators of value—both
Dell’s stock price and deal price—have substantial probative value.”); DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 373 (“[T]he price
at which its shares trade is informative of fair value . . . .”).
343
Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra note 15, at 323.
341
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consist of large numbers of identical securities trading on a deep market with
thousands or millions of participants.344 By contrast, the deal market consists of
the rather inconvenient unit of trade: entire companies.345 No two are exactly
alike, so the market is chunky rather than liquid, and the number of potential
buyers is exponentially smaller.346 As a result, few, if any, insights of the ECMH
offer any meaningful application to the deal market.347 The Supreme Court made
the self-evident mistake of treating the efficiency of the stock market as bearing
on the efficiency of the deal market. The efficiency of the stock market simply
has nothing to say about whether the deal process generated a price that
functions as a reliable proxy for fair value.
Breezy analogies between a corporation and a product or commodity are just
as unhelpful as analogies between a corporation and a share of stock trading on
a securities market. The Supreme Court in DFC Global claims that “an
economist would find that the fair market value of a company is what it would
sell for when there is a willing buyer and willing seller without any compulsion
to buy.”348 This might be true if the company were sold by a single owner into a
thick market of potential buyers. But any analogy between a merger and a
transaction between “a willing buyer and a willing seller” is virtually useless. In
a public company merger, the firm will be sold by a board of directors with
varying incentives, advised and assisted by inside managers and outside
professionals with still different incentives, and then put to a stockholder
plebiscite on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. Undoubtedly under certain conditions—
conditions that, the authors stress, will likely be met in most arm’s-length
deals—the outcome of that process will be a price that serves as an adequate
proxy for what the willing seller and buyer might have reached. But the
reliability of that price depends on the process that gave rise to it.
The Supreme Court’s opinion in DFC Global presents a truism about
pricing:
[I]n any assessment of the economic value of something—be it a
company, a product, or a service—economics teaches that the most
reliable evidence of value is that produced by a competitive market, so
344

Id.
Id.
346
Id.
347
See generally In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *24 (Del. Ch. May
31, 2016) (“It is perhaps more erroneous to claim that the thinner M&A market generates a price consistent with
fundamental efficiency, when the same claim is no longer made for the thicker markets in individual shares.”);
Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra note 15, at 323–24; Guhan Subramanian, The
Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Transactions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 695 (2003).
348
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 369 (Del. 2017).
345
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long as interested buyers are given a fair opportunity to price and bid
on something in question.349

For the appraisal inquiry, the relevant question is a threshold one: whether that
competitive market existed in the context of the deal market. Did the market for
a particular company operate in a way that generated complete information
about the value of the company? The market for the stock can supply no answer.
Further, as explained below, the efficiency of the deal market cannot be assumed
merely because directors complied with their fiduciary duties.350
In Dell, the Supreme Court makes the claim that failing to credit the deal
price in favor of a DCF analysis “was the antithesis of any economist’s definition
of fair market value.”351 But there are alternative ways of synthesizing a price
where a true market does not exist—corporate finance textbooks (written by
“economists”) overflow with them. DCF valuation is perhaps the most
prominent. The Delaware Supreme Court never fully engages with the question
of whether the conditions for the sale are adequate to generate a price that
conveys a reliable proxy for the value of the company. That is the market
efficiency question that matters in appraisal and, as explained further in the next
section, the Delaware Supreme Court does not offer a convincing answer to this
question.
C. Conflating the Fiduciary Duty and Appraisal Contexts
One of the most striking aspects of both opinions is that they casually
conflate questions of fiduciary liability with the valuation questions central to
appraisal disputes.
The fiduciary inquiry asks whether the board has met its obligations to a
degree sufficient to avoid personal liability, while the appraisal inquiry seeks to
determine the fair value of the company. One way of resolving the appraisal
inquiry is to determine whether the deal price contains sufficient information
about the company’s value. It is an obvious proposition—and one that should
not be controversial—that a board could fully meet its fiduciary duties while at
the same time running a sales process that results in a price that does not
adequately reflect the fair value of a company. As a result, there must necessarily
be an independent legal inquiry to determine whether the merger price conveys

349
350
351

Id. at 367. “This argument is sensible and in accordance with the economic literature.” Id.
See infra Section II.C.
Dell Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 37 (Del. 2017).
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that sort of information. Vice Chancellor Laster’s opinion in Lender
Processing352 was an intelligent step in that direction.
The fiduciary inquiry lines up poorly with the appraisal inquiry because
fiduciary standards are especially forgiving of director shortcomings for two
important reasons. First, directors—the defendants in fiduciary claims—face the
prospect of personal liability. If directors are too worried about their personal
liability, they may be too risk-averse in making decisions while on the board.
They would inevitably begin making decisions designed to minimize the risk of
personal liability, rather than maximize stockholder wealth.353 This would
diminish the expected returns of diversified public stockholders, a socially
undesirable outcome. Avoiding that result is one good reason—perhaps the best
one—that the fiduciary standards afford directors such wide latitude.354 Second,
fiduciary suits as a practical matter are controlled by attorneys, not stockholders.
There are substantial reasons to worry that class action attorneys are no more
faithful agents to stockholders than the allegedly disloyal directors on the other
end of the lawsuit.355 These are sensible reasons that fiduciary duty standards
have been especially forgiving of minor conflicts of interest and garden-variety
negligence in the boardroom.
In the Court of Chancery, these inquiries were kept intellectually distinct. In
Dell, for example, Vice Chancellor Laster considered the applicable fiduciary
duty standards and observed that “the Company’s process easily would sail
through if reviewed under enhanced scrutiny.”356 The court correctly noted that
the standards for the inquiries, although they both involve mergers, are
analytically distinct.357 Directors could satisfy their fiduciary duties in a
transaction where the sales process was nevertheless inadequate to demonstrate
fair value.358 As the Court of Chancery recognized, the only thing that matters
352
See Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., No. CV 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 7324170, at
*14–15 (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016).
353
See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND.
L. REV. 83 (2004) (arguing that the business judgment rule is premised on maximizing shareholder wealth).
354
See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[B]ecause potential profit often corresponds
to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that the law not create incentives for overly
cautious corporate decisions. . . . A rule which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives thus may
not be in the interest of shareholders generally.”); see also Korsmo, Delaware’s Retreat, supra note 13
(manuscript at 43–45).
355
See, e.g., Korsmo & Myers, Reforming Modern Appraisal Litigation, supra note 15, at 300–02.
356
In re Appraisal of Dell Inc., No. 9322-VCL, 2016 WL 3186538, at *29 (Del. Ch. May 31, 2016).
357
Id. at *26–27.
358
Id. at *27 (“Because the standards differ, it is entirely possible that the decisions made during a sale
process could fall within Revlon’s range of reasonableness, and yet the process still could generate a price that
was not persuasive evidence of fair value in an appraisal.”).
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about the sales process is whether it provides adequate information about the
value of the company.359
The two Supreme Court opinions let these distinct legal inquiries mingle
until it is impossible to say which is which. In Dell, the Supreme Court seemed
to join the inquiries as one:
[T]he Court of Chancery’s own summary remarks suggest the deal
price deserves weight as the court characterized the sales process as
one that ‘easily would sail through if reviewed under enhanced
scrutiny’ and observed that ‘[t]he Committee and its advisors did many
praiseworthy things,’ too numerous to catalog in its opinion, as the trial
court noted.360

This elision of the difference between the two standards is unlikely to be
accidental. For example, during his tenure on the Court of Chancery, Chief
Justice Strine was quite attentive to the difference between appraisal proceedings
and fiduciary duty claims.361 In Toys “R” Us, he denied a request to enjoin the
transaction on fiduciary grounds but emphasized that nevertheless any “loss of
dollar value” for stockholders “can be rectified adequately in a later appraisal
proceeding.”362 In Orchard Enterprises, he noted the unique rules that prevailed
in “an appraisal action, not a fiduciary duty case,” and he did not hesitate to
arrive at a going concern value that “no buyer was willing to pay.”363
In Dell and DFC Global, the Supreme Court seems to have simply assumed
that any transaction in which target directors met their fiduciary standards must
result in a merger price that is a reliable proxy for the company’s fair value.
More broadly, the court’s analysis evinces a faith that its own fiduciary duty
jurisprudence, as developed over the past four decades, has rendered mergers a
“solved problem,” and that nothing can be gained by intervention via appraisal.
Any such faith is unfounded. In reality, meeting the (generally appropriate) low
bar of minimum fiduciary standards364 offers little assurance that the resulting
deal price is informative as to fair value. As Eric Talley and Stephen Choi have
recently demonstrated, a sales process that easily satisfies Delaware’s

359
Id. at *26 (“The sales process is useful to the extent—and only to the extent—that it provides evidence
of the company’s value on the date the merger closed.”).
360
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 30–31 (Del. 2017).
361
See, e.g., In re Toys “R” Us, Inc. S’holder Litig., 877 A.2d 975, 979, 1023 (Del. Ch. 2005).
362
Id. at 1023.
363
In re Appraisal of the Orchard Enters., Inc., No. 5713-CS, 2012 WL 2923305, at *1, *5 (Del. Ch. July
28, 2012).
364
See supra notes 353–54 and accompanying text.
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deferential fiduciary duty standards can result in a negotiated price that departs
dramatically from the fair value that would emerge from an ideal auction.365
The Delaware Supreme Court’s faith in the optimality of the existing set of
fiduciary expectations—about defensive behavior, deal protection devices, and
manager conflicts—in fact seems to animate and underlie its opinions about the
efficiency of the deal market.366 The winner’s curse was a purely hypothetical
problem because no identifiable suitors declined to bid.367 The fair value award
was too high in Dell because no party had offered to pay that much.368 Because
no party offered to pay more than the transaction price, that must be the fair
value.369 The absence of bidders tells you only that no one was interested.370
Under this credulous view of the merger market, there can be no mispricing
so long as the board has not committed a culpable breach of duty. The body of
law that governs what defensive measures a company can deploy and what deal
protection devices can be incorporated into a merger agreement has been
optimized. The absence of a topping bid demonstrates the adequacy of the
merger price. Controlling stockholder transactions have been cured by the
healing hands of MFW,371 and board disloyalty—both subtle and overt—could
not have been a meaningful problem if stockholders approved the deal.372 The
only credible evidence that something is wrong would be a thwarted bidder

365

See Choi & Talley, supra note 28 (manuscript at 3).
See supra Section I.D.2.
367
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 32 (Del. 2017) (“[A]side
from the theoretical, the Court of Chancery did not point to any bidder who actually shied away from exploring
an acquisition out of fear of the winner’s curse phenomenon.”).
368
See id. at 37 (“[The fair value determination] did not reflect the value that private equity buyers
(including the biggest players such as KKR, TPG, and Blackstone) put on it, as it was too high for any of them
to pay. The trial court also picked a price higher than any strategic [buyer] would pay because, in economic
terms, no strategic [buyer] believed it could exploit a purported $6.8 billion value gap because the risks and costs
of acquiring Dell and integrating it into its company dwarfed any potential for profit and synergy gains if Dell
were purchased at the Court of Chancery’s determination of fair value.”).
369
Id. at 33 (“The more likely explanation for the lack of a higher bid is that the deal market was already
robust and that a topping bid involved a serious risk of overpayment.”).
370
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 375–76 n.154 (Del. 2017) (“[T]he
absence of synergistic buyers for a company is itself relevant to its value.”); id. at 376 (noting that one “objective
factor[] that support[s] the fairness of the price paid” was “the failure of other buyers to pursue the company
when they had a free chance to do so”).
371
See generally Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635 (Del. 2014).
372
See, e.g., Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 312–13 (Del. 2015) (“[W]hen a
transaction is not subject to the entire fairness standard, the long-standing policy of our law has been to avoid
the uncertainties and costs of judicial second-guessing when the disinterested stockholders have had the free and
informed chance to decide on the economic merits of a transaction for themselves.”).
366
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appearing in the Court of Chancery seeking an injunction before a transaction
closes.373
The Supreme Court at times comes perilously close to endorsing the view
that, because bidders are so aggressive,374 when a transaction is announced
publicly,375 the absence of a topping bid means the deal must be priced at (or
above) the fair value.376 Under this view, the involvement of actual participants
in the sales process scarcely matters, because the universe of theoretical potential
bidders is so large.
D. Wringing Common Sense from Appraisal
There is a peculiar coda to the Court of Chancery’s DFC Global opinion. In
its opinion, the Court of Chancery calculated a DCF valuation of $13.07, and it
gave that a one-third weighting in its final analysis.377 After the court issued its
opinion, the company pointed out that the court’s calculation relied on working
capital numbers different from those the opinion had expressly adopted.378
Making that change alone would reduce the discounted cash flow value
substantially, to $7.70, well below the $9.50 transaction price.379 The Court of
Chancery corrected that error but also made an additional change at the same
time: at the suggestion of the dissenters, the court increased the perpetuity
growth rate.380 The DCF value resulting from both changes was $13.33—
roughly in line with the original DCF valuation.381 The company howled in
protest at what the Court of Chancery had done, suggesting that the change
revealed a troubling “arbitrariness and manipulability of discounted cash flow
models.”382 The Delaware Supreme Court reversed this particular change,
373
See id. at 312 (arguing that “Unocal and Revlon are primarily designed to give stockholders and the
Court of Chancery the tool of injunctive relief to address important M&A decisions in real time, before closing.
They were not tools designed with post-closing money damages claims in mind . . . .”).
374
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 367 (Deals occur in a “universe of equally avid capitalists with an incentive
to reap rewards by buying the asset if it is too cheaply priced.”).
375
Id. at 349 (The price “resulted from an open process, informed by robust public information, and easy
access to deeper, non-public information, in which many parties with an incentive to make a profit had a chance
to bid.”).
376
See id. at 376 (“[N]o one was willing to bid more in the months leading up to the transaction . . . .”).
377
Id. at 351, 359.
378
Id. at 377.
379
Id.
380
Id. at 350.
381
Id. at 379.
382
Appellant’s Opening Brief at 6, DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346 (Del.
2017) (No. 10107-CB). (“The fact that the perpetuity-growth-rate adjustment had the effect of returning the ‘fair
value’ determination to roughly the same level as before the court corrected its mathematical error demonstrates
the arbitrariness and manipulability of discounted cash flow models.”).
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concluding that there was no basis in the record for making that change to the
perpetuity growth rate.383
It is, of course, easy to mock the “convenient” fact that the Court of
Chancery’s errors almost exactly cancelled each other out, and the appearance
it creates that the calculations were, in effect, reverse engineered to reach a
predetermined result. Nonetheless, the Chancellor’s approach illustrated an
important aspect of valuation: that human judgment is essential to the valuation
exercise.384 Furthermore, one important check on the reliability of inputs to a
valuation calculation is that the result comports at least roughly with other
potential markers of value.
The Supreme Court was wrong to reduce the statutory exercise in a case like
DFC Global to a robotic exercise of arithmetic, aloof from considerations of
common sense. In reality, human judgment is essential to the valuation exercise;
the multivariate models require experience and care in selecting the appropriate
inputs.385 The Delaware Court of Chancery, given its diet of corporate cases and
its disinterested stance, is uniquely well-positioned to exercise that care.
Financial models also require a reality check on the ultimate output. As one
influential treatise puts it, “estimating the value of a real business requires the
application of judgment that can only be developed through experience.”386 The
Supreme Court seems to recognize this general principle in its opinions, chiding
the Court of Chancery for retreating to “the visual appeal of a mathematical
formula to create an impression of precision[, but recognizing that this] is
understandable” in the face of a reality that “is sloppy and unpredictable.”387 In
DFC Global, it is the Supreme Court that appears to place too much confidence
in mathematical formulae.

383

DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 350–51.
For example, the fairness opinion provided by Houlihan Lokey—DFC Global’s financial adviser—
was prefaced with the following language, variations of which can be found in every such valuation: “The
preparation of such an opinion is a complex process involving various quantitative and qualitative judgments
and determinations with respect to the financial, comparative and other analytical methods employed and the
adaptation and application of these methods to the unique facts and circumstances presented . . . . [M]athematical
derivations (such as the high, low, mean and median) of financial data are not themselves meaningful and in
selecting the ranges of multiples to be applied were considered in conjunction with experience and the exercise
of judgment.” DFC Glob. Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Schedule 14A) 35–36 (May 1, 2014) (emphasis
added).
385
BRADFORD CORNELL, CORPORATE VALUATION: TOOLS FOR EFFECTIVE APPRAISAL AND DECISION
MAKING 6–7 (Amy Hollands & Jess Ann Ramirez eds., 1993) (“Financial models have not developed to the
point where they can be applied without practical experience and judgment.”).
386
Id. at 6.
387
DFC Glob., 172 A.3d at 388.
384
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The way that the Court of Chancery corrected for its mistake is, perhaps
counterintuitively, evidence of a system working well. The court was plainly
convinced the sale of DFC Global was inadequate.388 Chancellor Bouchard was
not alone in this judgment. From the moment the transaction was announced,
market participants heaped criticism on it. The negotiated price was only 6%
above the company’s prior stock price.389 Even before the proxy was filed, a
large stockholder called the price “absurdly low” and observed that the “process
seem[ed] to have been geared to a single buyer in the absence of competition.”390
After the proxy was filed, another large stockholder protested that management
“did not run anything resembling a robust sales process.”391 According to one
analyst, the company’s U.S. and Canada business alone was worth almost as
much as the amount being paid for the entire company.392 ISS, the proxy adviser,
recommended that stockholders vote against the transaction.393
As his opinion indicates, the Chancellor, having presided over the trial,
became convinced that the sale price fell short of fair value.394 Under such
circumstances, any mathematical valuation exercise that produced an output
below the merger consideration would necessarily have to be rejected as
unrealistic. If your calculator tells you that 1 + 1 = 3, your calculator is broken.
The reliability of any DCF valuation must perforce be measured in view of the
degree to which the sales process was deficient—a matter within the special
expertise of the Court of Chancery. It is patently absurd to find that the
transactional process was bad but nevertheless the resulting price conferred
excess value upon the stockholders.395 To force the Court of Chancery to adopt
only one change—and one that would immediately produce results at odds with
reality—would be in conflict with, in the parlance of the Delaware Supreme

388
See generally In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at 1 (Del. Ch.
July 8, 2016).
389
SpringOwl Assocs. LLC, SpringOwl Asset Management Expresses Concerns Over DFC Global Corp.
Sale Agreement, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 2, 2014, 4:03 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/
springowl-asset-management-expresses-concerns-over-dfc-global-corp-sale-agreement-253616381.html.
390
Id.
391
Royal Capital Mgmt., LLC, Royal Capital Issues Letter to DFC Global Corp. Board of Directors, PR
NEWSWIRE (Apr. 23, 2014, 9:00 AM), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/royal-capital-issues-letterto-dfc-global-corp-board-of-directors-256342841.html.
392
Complaint at 3–4, In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., WL 3753123, at *1, No. 9520-VCP.
393
Royal Capital Mgmt., LLC, supra note 391.
394
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 360–61 (Del. 2017).
395
In the wake of Dell and DFC Global, the Delaware Supreme Court summarily affirmed an appraisal
opinion below that found both (1) a defective deal process; and (2) a fair value substantially below the deal price.
See In re Appraisal of SWS Group, No. 10554-VCG, 2017 WL 2334852, at *15 (Del. Ch. May 30, 2017), aff’d
sub nom. Merlin Partners, L.P. v. SWS Group, Inc., No. 295, 2017, 2018 WL 1037477, at *1 (Del. Feb. 23,
2018).
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Court’s opinions, “established principles of corporate finance.”396 Yet that is
precisely what the Supreme Court did.
Delaware’s case law, of course, has recognized that the judgment of the
Court of Chancery is a necessary ingredient in the statutory appraisal exercise.397
As a Vice Chancellor, Chief Justice Strine emphasized the importance of the
trial judge’s judgment in attending to factors that would bear on the value of the
business but which would not be captured by inputs in models.398 The Supreme
Court’s DFC Global opinion—and Dell, as well—seemingly abandons this
insight. Expecting any judge—let alone judges as sophisticated as the members
of the Delaware Court of Chancery—to behave in such a robotic fashion is
unrealistic. And it would be undesirable. As has long been recognized, the
experience and wisdom of the Court of Chancery is one of the singular
attractions in Delaware.399 It is this very sort of protection that reduces the cost
of capital formation in the first place.
Curiously, the Supreme Court did not give up on the role of judgment in
appraisal entirely. It abandoned only the role of the Court of Chancery’s
judgment. In its place, it offered an alternative suggestion for what would
constitute good judgment: that the company’s sales process “should have given
the Court doubts about the reliability of its discounted cash flow analysis.”400
But the Court of Chancery, having shepherded the case for two years and
presided over a multi-day trial—had the opposite reaction to the evidence.401
The Supreme Court is removed from the presentation of trial evidence and from
daily exposure to the particulars of corporate disputes. Its determination to
substitute its own intuition about the implications of the evidence for that of the
trial court further evinces its conviction that the sales price must be fully

396

Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 24 (Del. 2017).
Glassman v. Unocal Expl. Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 248 (Del. 2001) (“The determination of fair value must
be based on all relevant factors, including damages and elements of future value, where appropriate. So, for
example, if the merger was timed to take advantage of a depressed market, or a low point in the company’s
cyclical earnings, or to precede an anticipated positive development, the appraised value may be adjusted to
account for these factors.”).
398
Del. Open MRI Radiology Assocs., P.A. v. Kessler, 898 A.2d 290, 315 (Del. Ch. 2006) (“The dangers
for the minority arguably are most present when the controller knows that the firm is on the verge of breakthrough growth, having gotten the hang of running the first few facilities, and now being well-positioned to
replicate its success at additional locations—think McDonald’s or Starbucks.”).
399
See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate
Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061 (2000) (discussing the success Delaware has had in attracting public
companies to incorporate in its state due to its preferable corporate law).
400
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Murfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 379 (Del. 2017).
401
In re Appraisal of DFC Glob. Corp., No. 10107-CB, 2016 WL 3753123, at *5 (Del. Ch. July 8, 2016).
397
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informative of fair value whenever the directors involved met minimum
fiduciary requirements.
III. THE ROAD AHEAD
The defects in the Delaware Supreme Court’s Dell and DFC Global opinions
threaten to sow confusion for years to come, in appraisal cases and beyond. In
this Part, we sketch out some of the coming debates.
A. Clarifying the Conditions for a Fully-Informational Sales Process
The evidence suggests that the appraisal remedy can be a useful tool of
corporate governance.402 The critical judicial task is to apply the remedy in a
way that incentivizes managerial behavior that promotes the interest of
diversified, public stockholders. Nobody, however, wants courts to routinely
second-guess the judgments of the market. Appraisal is only a second-best
solution to the problem of pricing public companies, and nobody, to our
knowledge, argues otherwise. The idea that price discovery will almost always
be best performed by a robust auction commands wide support. The DCF
methodology, in particular, is a second-best method for estimating the value of
a company that should be resorted to only when the sales process is inadequate.
On that point, too, there is little dispute.403
The heated dispute, of course, is about what constitutes an inadequate
process. As explored above, these two Supreme Court cases suggest (but do not
explicitly hold) that the price resulting from any sales process where target
directors meet their fiduciary obligations is fully informative of the company’s
value and should stand as the fair value in an appraisal proceeding. As Guhan
Subramanian has said, “[c]ommentators called [DFC Global] a ‘presumption in
everything but name,’ and I agree with that assessment.”404
Unfortunately, collapsing the inquiries in this way will inhibit the utility of
appraisal as a tool of corporate governance. For most public companies mergers,
the sales processes is adequate and results in a price that is sufficiently
informative of the company’s value. But the sales process can be deficient for
402

See supra Section I.B.
See Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 35 (Del. 2017) (“[A]
DCF analysis can provide the court with a helpful data point about the price a sales process would have produced
had there been a robust sale process involving willing buyers with thorough information and the time to make a
bid.”); id. at 38 (DCF valuations are “widely considered the best tool for valuing companies when there is no
credible market information and no market check “).
404
Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 12).
403
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any number of reasons. As the amici in DFC Global emphasized: “To be sure,
the price resulting from an arm’s-length process may accurately reflect fair
value. But not always. In numerous seemingly benign cases, a facially
disinterested process can still render a price falling short of fair value.”405
The Delaware Supreme Court’s approach could generate a range of possible
results. One possibility is that every appraisal action will turn into a minifiduciary duty proceeding, increasing litigation costs and possibly increasing the
in terrorem value of nuisance claims.406 Another possibility is that the Supreme
Court’s seemingly bright-line approach will generate a window for opportunism
that crafty acquirers—and their abettors at the target company—can exploit.
Reducing Delaware merger law to a formalistic checklist that, when followed,
will allow well-advised acquirers to dance past the scrutiny and judgment of the
Court of Chancery is an unwelcome development, one that will have deleterious
effects on diversified, public company stockholders. The utility of the public
markets as an engine for capital formation will ultimately suffer along with
them.407
One issue that will inevitably arise is whether reliance on financial
techniques like DCF valuation can improve the statutory fair value analysis
when the sales process merely meets minimum fiduciary standards. The
Supreme Court has not ruled that out. The Court of Chancery in Lender
Processing Services engaged in a careful and sophisticated review of the
variables that influence the persuasiveness of the transaction price, separate and
apart from fiduciary analysis.408 The court examined, among other things, the
level of competition among bidders before the deal was signed, the reliability of
the information supplied to bidders, whether the company played favorites or
colluded with any bidders, and any post-signing developments that would
materially increase or decrease the value of the firm.409 This approach, whose
viability is unclear in the wake of these Supreme Court opinions, supplies

405
Brief of Law, Economics, and Corporate Finance Professors as Amici Curiae in Support of PetitionersAppellees and Affirmance, supra note 173, at 2.
406
See Korsmo & Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage, supra note 1, at 1586–88 (arguing that the lower and more
symmetrical litigation costs associated with appraisal make nuisance claims less likely than in fiduciary duty
actions).
407
See, e.g., Subramanian, supra note 11 (manuscript at 33) (“The ‘law and finance’ literature
demonstrates that protecting minority shareholders improves capital formation. The intuition for this empirical
finding is that prospective investors in the next dorm room startup will be wary to commit capital if they do not
have adequate protections at exit.”).
408
Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., Inc., No. 9320-VCL, 2016 WL 7324170, at *15–23
(Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016).
409
Id.
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exactly what Delaware has long been known for: predictability for potential
parties to a transaction and safeguards for non-controlling stockholders.410 The
Court of Chancery should continue to develop this line of reasoning to avoid
opening a window for opportunism, and the Supreme Court should support that
effort.
B. The Fall of Defensive Tactics?
The explicit adoption of strong form market efficiency in Dell and DFC
Global also generates a deep contradiction in Delaware’s jurisprudence.411
Delaware law had long permitted a board of directors to fight off an unwanted
takeover—even one at a large premium to the market price, and manifestly
favored by the stockholders—solely for the reason that the offer is at an
“inadequate price.”412 Over twenty years ago, the Supreme Court pronounced
that “the directors of a Delaware corporation have the prerogative to determine
that the market undervalues its stock and to protect its stockholders from offers
that do not reflect the long term value of the corporation under its present
management plan.”413 These conclusions enable a board to deploy significant
defensive firepower to keep even willing stockholders from receiving a bid from
a willing acquirer.414 The foundations for this body of law have now been
washed away. The predicate ideas—of an “inadequate price” or that a
corporation has some value separate from its trading price—are in direct conflict
with Dell and DFC Global.
Under the Supreme Court’s approach in Dell and DFC Global, any marketclearing price for the stock is necessarily adequate and cannot constitute a
cognizable threat to corporate policy. As the Dell opinion explained, “[w]hen an
asset has few, or no, buyers at the price selected, that is not a sign that the asset
410

See Fisch, supra note 399.
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 24 (Del. 2017) (“[T]he Court
of Chancery’s analysis ignored the efficient market hypothesis long endorsed by this Court. It teaches that the
price produced by an efficient market is generally a more reliable assessment of fair value than the view of a
single analyst, especially an expert witness who caters her valuation to the litigation imperatives of a well-heeled
client.”).
412
See, e.g., Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d 1361, 1385 (Del. 1995) (“The record appears to
support Unitrin’s argument that the Board’s justification for adopting the Repurchase Program was its reasonably
perceived risk of substantive coercion, i.e., that Unitrin’s shareholders might accept American General’s
inadequate Offer because of ‘ignorance or mistaken belief’ regarding the Board’s assessment of the long-term
value of Unitrin’s stock.”); Air Prods. & Chem., Inc. v. Airgas, Inc., 16 A.3d 48, 57 (Del. Ch. 2011) (“Inadequate
price has become a form of ‘substantive coercion’ as that concept has been developed by the Delaware Supreme
Court in its takeover jurisprudence.”).
413
Unitrin, 651 A.2d at 1376.
414
See Air Prods. & Chem., 16 A.3d at 111–13.
411
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is stronger than believed—it is a sign that it is weaker.”415 If an acquirer is
willing to pay some price above the prevailing market price, it is not clear what
grounds would exist upon which a board could justify resistance.416
Moreover, the Supreme Court conflates the market for the entire company
with the spot market for the individual shares, assuming they reflect a valuation
on the same underlying set of property rights.417 In that sense, the company is
always for sale. The idea of a company being not for sale, as Time Inc. was said
to be in Paramount Communications,418 is in unavoidable conflict with Dell and
DFC Global. The resolution of these issues will no doubt figure in future cases
before the Court of Chancery and the Supreme Court. Ultimately, the Supreme
Court will be forced to decide whether its respect for market pricing is consistent
or merely situational—strong when it disfavors appraisal petitioners; weak when
it disfavors corporate managers.
C. Defining and Quantifying the Concept of “Synergies”
The appraisal statute entitles dissenting stockholders to the fair value of the
company, excluding any “element of value arising from the accomplishment or
expectation of the merger or consolidation.”419 In an appraisal proceeding, the
court must exclude from the deal price any value attributable to “synergies.”420
The concept of a “synergy” has received little judicial or scholarly attention.
The landmark Weinberger case suggested that the Court of Chancery should not
“take speculative effects of the merger into account.”421 Likewise, the court in
Cavalier Oil noted that the company must be valued “without regard to postmerger events or other possible business combinations.”422 The idea is to ignore
the acquirer’s plans for the target company in assigning some value to it. In DFC
Global, the Delaware Supreme Court offered brief ruminations on the synergy

415

Dell, 177 A.3d at 37.
See id. at 29 (“Fair value entails at minimum a price some buyer is willing to pay—not a price at which
no class of buyers in the market would pay.”).
417
See supra notes 340–47.
418
Paramount Commc’ns, Inc. v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149–51 (Del. 1990).
419
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(h) (West 2018) (citing to most recent electronic version).
420
M.P.M. Enters., Inc. v. Gilbert, 731 A.2d 790, 797 (Del. 1999) (“[S]ection 262(h) requires that the
Court of Chancery discern the going concern value of the company irrespective of the synergies involved in a
merger.”).
421
Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 714 (Del. 1983).
422
Cavalier Oil Corp. v. Harnett, 564 A.2d 1137, 1144 (Del. 1989).
416
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concept along these lines, indicating that one policy goal is to preserve the
incentive for the acquirer to move forward with the transaction.423
The approach to synergies that makes the most sense from an economic
perspective is to exclude only those elements of value that are unique to the
particular acquirer. This comports with case law in Delaware that excludes as
synergies the value that arises “solely from the deal.”424 Importantly, it also
preserves the acquirer’s incentives to pursue the efficiency-generating
transactions. On this account, any element of value that would be common to
any acquirer is one that should be shared with the target stockholders. One
preliminary approach in practice to estimating this element of value would look
to competing bids. The deduction of synergies is only relevant when the court
relies on the transaction price, and generally speaking that is only appropriate in
circumstances where, among other things, there are multiple bids for the
company. The second-highest bid might be a starting place for a rough estimate
of the lower bound of the value excluding synergies, as it would capture any
value that is common to more than one buyer and thus not unique to the actual
acquirer.
CONCLUSION
In Dell and DFC Global, the Delaware Supreme Court suggested that it only
sought to apply “established principles of corporate finance.”425 Yet the opinions
are built on misunderstandings of the financial ideas at issue in the cases, and
misapply standard economic concepts. This Article has cataloged the four
foundational finance errors that the court made. First, it ignored the differences
between the pricing of risk in public markets and in private markets. Second, the
court failed to attend to the distinction between the well-supported evidence of
information efficiency in securities markets and the more contested idea of value
efficiency. The court magnified this error by attributing value efficiency not
simply to the securities market but also to the very different market for entire
companies. Third, the court muddied the legal standards at play in the fiduciary
duty and appraisal contexts, leaving trial courts with the unfounded implication
423
DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., 172 A.3d 346, 368 (Del. 2017) (“[T]hat statutory
language could be interpreted to address the narrower, if still important, policy concern that the specific buyer
not end up losing its upside for purchase by having to pay out the expected gains from its own business plans
for the company it bought to the petitioners.”).
424
Merion Capital L.P. v. BMC Software, Inc., No. 8900-VCG, 2015 WL 6164711, at *14 (Del. Ch. Oct.
21, 2015) (“[T]he appraisal statute requires that the Court exclude any synergies present in the deal price—that
is, value arising solely from the deal.”).
425
Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Glob. Event Driven Master Fund Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 24 (Del. 2017); see DFC
Glob., 172 A.3d at 349.
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that conditions of pricing efficiency are met whenever directors satisfy their
minimum fiduciary obligations. Last, the court attempted to strip the judicial
valuation exercise of human judgment, relying instead on mechanical,
arithmetical calculations. The consequence of these mistakes will mean that
opportunistic transactions may escape meaningful scrutiny in the Delaware
courts, a decidedly unwelcome result that will leave ordinary investors exposed
and inhibit capital formation through Delaware firms.

